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I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of credit in our economy is staggering, and its growth
has been phenomenal. Outstanding consumer credit, which alone
amounted to $180 billion in 1973, has doubled since 1965.1 Increases
in the rates charged for the lending of these funds have accompanied
the volume growth. This is exemplified by the increase in rates
0 Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.A., University of Nebraska,
1965, J.D., 1968.
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TABLE OF REPEATING CITATIONS
Twelve sources are cited repeatedly throughout this article. For these, a short form
corresponding to the table below has been used.
Short Form Full Citation
CHAPMAN & SHAY
Collins & Ham
CONSUMER CREDIT
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S.
Hershman
HoLDswoRTH
Johnson
Merriman & Hanks
MICHELMAN
Oeltjen
Pearce & Williams
ROBINSON & NUGENT
THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: ITS COSTS AND REGU-
LATION (Chapman & Shay eds. 1967).
Collins & Ham, The Usury Law of Arkansas: A Study of
Evasion, 8 ARK. L.J. 399 (1954).
CONSUMER CREDIT INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, CONSUMER
CREDIT AND ITS USES (1938).
NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES (1972).
Hershman, Usury and the Tight Money Market, 22
Bus. LAw. 333 (1967).
8 W. HOLSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (2d ed.
1937).
Johnson, Interest and Usury in CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL
FINANCE LAW, THE REALITIES OF MAXIMUM INTEREST
AND FINANCE CHARGES (1970).
Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in
'Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REV. 1 (1967).
I. MICHELMAN, CONSUMER FINANCE: A CASE HISTORY IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1966).
Oeltjen, Florida's New Consumer Finance Act, or, What-
ever Happened to "Small" Loan Laws, 1 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 373 (1973).
Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience
-A Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233
(1968).
L. ROBINSON & R. NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL
LOAN BUSINESS (1935).
1. NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, 1974 FINANCE FACTS YEARBOOK 46.
See also FED. RES. BULL. (Jan. 1975).
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charged the most creditworthy customers, appropriately called the
"prime rate." During the 1966-67 period of "tight money," the prime
rate rose from its prior five year level of 4.5 percent to a hefty 6 per-
cent.2 In many jurisdictions this new level was at or near the then-
current interest rate (usury) ceilings. Then came the tight-money
market of 1969, about which one writer commented: "With the
prime rate at this writing having reached the dizzying level of 7 per-
cent, it is obvious that even institutional first mortgage lending must
go to 8 percent or better."3 The current period of tight money has
seen the prime rate peak at 12 percent to 12.25 percent.4 This current
peak, following the terminology of the above author, could aptly be
described as "astronomical."
As interest rates move up, lenders are caught in a squeeze between
their cost of capital and the rate they can legally charge to their
borrowers. 5 This squeeze, which occurs in every segment of the lending
industry, forces lenders to adopt more selective lending practices.
6
Such practices are to be expected because of the decreased profit
margin available to cover risk of nonpayment. But as lending standards
are tightened to lower risk, sources of credit dry up for the less credit-
worthy, those with lower incomes or poor credit histories. Thus a
lender might be forced to discontinue certain types of loans that it
would otherwise make, simply because it cannot afford to lend money
to certain borrowers at the ceiling rate.
In periods of tight money, moneylenders of all types resort to
diverse methods to avoid restrictive interest rate (usury) ceilings.
Lenders use mandatory credit life, health and accident insurance;
service fees; recording fees; and a system of points to extract more
money from borrowers. 7 In view of these increased costs and the
current uncertainty about the economy, consumers are repaying their
loans at a record pace. In November, 1974, consumer borrowing
dropped by a record $402 million.8 This was followed in December
by a drop of $877 million.9 This was the first time credit dropped for
two consecutive months since 1958. Moreover, it dropped in rapidly
2. Hershman 333.
3. Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market-Revisited, 24 Bus. LAW. 1121,
1131 (1969).
4. Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 6, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 5.
5. See St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 10, 1974, § D, at 4, col. 2.
6. Id.
7. NEwswEFK, Nov. 11, 1974, at 102-03.
8. WALL STRE JOURNAL, FEB. 6, 1975, at 3, col. 2.
9. Id.
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increasing amounts.10 During this same period there had also been
a "sharp decline in business loans.""'
In addition to these more direct costs, debtors pay for the. in.
direct costs of administering the complex usury statutes. Since each
segment of the credit industry is regulated at a-different rate, which
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a myriad of regulations result.
One finance company reported it had to stock 126 different forms
merely to comply with the various statutes and regulations concerning
consumer credit.'2 This-complexity is additionally detrimental to the
borrower because it makes it difficult for even seasoned observers to
understand whether what they have been charged is legal, or even
competitive. It is to this system of regulations that this article is de-
voted. It is hoped the reader will gain a true understanding of the
rationale, or lack thereof, of this system.
II. HISTORY
A. General History
Even in primitive society private property, which is essential to
a credit economy, existed as personal ornaments, weapons, and dress.' s
Lending had a different connotation than it has today; it was done
easily and naturally, and the common understanding typically was
that the borrowed item should be returned.14 There was, of course,
no charge for the item lent. As society became less nomadic and more
complicated, and land became susceptible of private ownership, the
concept of lending for a charge came into being. 5
Throughout history few classes of transactions have so evoked the
emotions of men as the lending of money for interest. It has been
condemned as sinful, oppressive, or just wrong; it has been both
legislated against and denounced by monarchs. But loans were still
made, and interest was taken despite severe penalties.16 Even after
the legalization of moderate interest charges by the enactment of
usury laws, those who charged for the use of money were not thought
well of by society. Dante described the fate of usurers as permanent
residence in the Seventh Circle of Hell.1 7 Jews historically have been
maligned as moneylenders and usurers, as in Shakespeare's The Mer-
10. Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 6, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 5.
11. Id.
12. Johnson, Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 46 HARV. Bus. REv. 119, 120 (1968).
13. ROBINSON & NUGENT 13-14.
14. P. RADIN, SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY .108 (1932), ascited in ROBINSON & NUGENT 14.
15. See ROBINSON & NUGENT 15-16.
16. M. NEIFELD, THE PERSONAL FINANCE BUSINESS 19-20 (1933).
17. DANTE, DIVINE COMEDY, THE .INFERNO: CANTO VII.
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chant of Venice. Ironically the Italian story on which Shakespeare
based his play had as its usurer a Christian, and a Jew as the one who
pledged his "pound of flesh."' 8
Usury, then defined as the taking of any interest, was virtually
prohibited in Old Testament times." The Old Testament is quite
explicit on interest taking; 0 the New Testament, however, offers no
definite guidance, although the parable of the talents21 shows at least
a tolerance of lending money at interest."
Other ancient cultures reacted similarly to moneylending for
profit. 3 Although the ancient Greeks had no prohibition against
taking interest, nor statutes regulating the rate, social and commercial
practice operated to keep the rates within reasonable bounds '
Aristotle thought that payment for the use of money was not natural
since money was barren and could produce nothing,2 but his position
had scant effect on moneylending in his time. 6 In Republican Rome,
charging interest for the use of money was prohibited, but, because
of the realities of growing commerce, interest taking was a normal
practice during the time of the Empire.'7
The general attitude of the Church in early Christendom was that
usury (interest taking) simply was wrong. 8 Later, in medieval and
18. F. GuIzoT, SHAKESPEARE AND His TIMES (1855), as cited in Bernstein, Background
of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846, 850 (1965).
19. See, e.g., Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:35-37; Psalms 15:2-5. But interest taking on
loans to foreigners was allowed. Deuteronomy 23:19-21. Roman law did not recognize
usury as the taking of excessive interest, for "interest . . . meant the compensation for
damage or loss suffered by the creditor resulting from the debtor's failure to return
the loan (itself gratuitous in principle) at the date specified by the contract"; rather,
usury was "a payment for the (use) of money itself." T. DIVINE, INTEREST 3-4 (1958). The
standard modern definition of usury is the taking of interest above the lawful rate.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1714 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
20. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
21. For those who are unfamiliar with this parable and would be unlikely to refer
to it: "Thou oughtest therefore to have committed my money to the bankers, and at
my coming I should have received my own with usury." Matthew 25:27. One may in-
terpret this parable as more than mere tolerance.
22. T. DIVINE, supra note 19, at 24-26.
23. The Koran, the laws of China, and the Hindu Institute of Manu (over 2%
annual) put interest taking outside the law. Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns 367 (N.Y. 1819),
as cited in McConlogue, Usury, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. 253, 254 (1928).
24. Johnson 5, 7-9. Different rates were charged according to whether the loan was
a personal or commercial transaction. See M. NEIFELD, supra note 16, at 19.
25. Aristotle's view of the unnaturalness of interest taking was based on his belief
in the barrenness of money itself, not on the social effect of the practice. Johnson
9.
26. ROBINSON & NUGENT 20.
27. Bowsher, Usury Laws: Harmful When Effective, 56 FED. RES. BANK OF ST.
Louis 16 (1974).
28. Comment, Should Usury Statutes Be Used To Solve the Installment Sales "Prob-
lem"?, 5 B.C. Irn. & COM. L. REV. 389, 391 (1964).
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Renaissance Europe, the Church and the State joined to prohibit
interest taking.29 Thomas Aquinas' views on usury (interest taking)
fairly well represented the prevailing anti-interest stand. His views
have been summarized in a most interesting way: "When one demands
over and above the return of the original sum loaned, an added
amount purely for the use of the money, it is the same thing as
charging a man the market price for a glass of beer and then charging
him again simply for the privilege of drinking it." 0
The rise of trade and commerce during the late Middle Ages,
coupled with exceptions to the absolute prohibition against interest
taking, weakened but did not eliminate this strong adverse reaction
to usury.31 It was during this period that the Church itself, through the
Franciscan order of monks, created in certain locations in Italy the
montes pietatis, a fund from which loans could be made to the poor
at a low rate of return.32 Indeed, by 1730 the Pope had disclaimed any
right to interfere in the question of usury. 3
During the middle 1500's the opinion of Protestant leaders
wavered. Martin Luther generally was against the taking of interest;
Melancthon, on the other hand, saw the necessity of allowing interest
taking to stimulate trade.34 Calvin, although by no means a proponent
of interest taking, distinguished moderate interest taking from usury
(the excessive taking of interest, as it was later defined).3s He ap-
proached the subject of moneylending as both a theologian and a man
of business.3 6
England, in 1545 under Henry VIII, was the first of the European
countries to establish a "legal" rate of interest.37 This forerunner of all
usury laws recognized the legal right to take interest but reserved the
regulation of rates to the state. 38 Interest rates continued to be regulated
in England, and the target of criticism shifted from the total prohibi-
tion of interest to the necessity or reason for any usury limitation.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the "liberal" laissez-
faire opinions of such men as Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Ben-
29. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 92.
30. Hagarty, Concerning Usury, 8 CAN. B.J. 185, 188 (1965).
31. Collins & Ham 400.
32. ROBINSON & NUGENT 23; HOLDSWORTH 106.
33. Johnson 5, 16.
34. See HOLosWORTH 109; Bernstein, supra note 18, at 848. But see Bowsher,
supra note 27.
35. HoLDswoRTH 109.
36. Id.
37. "Though this action was soon reversed, interest was again made legal in 1571
and has remained so ever since." CONSUMER CRaIT 8.
38. M. NEIFEL, supra note 16, at 330.
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jamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson created a feeling that freedom
from restrictions was the "natural order."2 9 This belief in freedom
set the stage for the questioning of the concept of usury.40 Jeremy
Bentham's superbly written Letters in Defence of Usury41 is known
as one of the most adept arguments against laws setting rate ceilings.
Most articles concerning usury written since Bentham's time have been
basically restatements of Bentham's view. Turgot, Bentham's French
counterpart, shared Bentham's views and carried on the resistance
to usury laws in France. 42
Due largely to the atmosphere created by philosophers such as
Bentham, England repealed its usury law in 1854.43 For 46 years,
England existed without a usury law of any type. Then, in 1900,
the English Parliament established the Money-lenders Act which did
not specify an absolute lawful rate of interest but prohibited un-
conscionable rates; rates above a set maximum were presumed to be
unconscionable.4 4
During American colonial times, legislation was patterned after
English statutes,' 5 specifically the Statute of Anne.46 The early
Americans brought with them the prevailing attitudes toward in-
terest,4 7 including the 6 percent lawful rate.4" Although Massachusetts
in 1661 adopted a legal rate of 8 percent, 49 most of the colonies followed
the lead of Maryland and adopted a 6 percent rate. 50 The 6 percent
pattern was well set, and by 1776 all the former English colonies had
39. CONSUMER CREDIT 8, 9.
40. Id.
41. Bentham's position on the advantages of a laissez-faire economy is articulated
well in Letter I:
... [N]o man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes
open, ought to be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such
bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit: nor (what is a necessary
consequence) anybody hindered from supplying him, upon any terms he thinks
proper to accede to.
3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3 (J. Bowring ed. 1962).
42. Johnson 14.
43. HOLDSWORTH 112; Collins & Ham 400.
44. HOLDSWORTH 112.
45. Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of the Lex Debitoris,
55 CALIF. L. REv. 123, 131 (1967).
46. Hershman 335.
47. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 274-75 (1963).
48. Id.
49. The statute was established in the form of a general order stating "that no
man shall be adjudged for the mere forbearance of a debt above eight pounds in the
hundred for one year." Address by Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., Consumer Credit Project
of the Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law, June 19, 1968, at 3.
50. S. HOMER, supra note 47, at 275.
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usury laws similar to England.51 After independence, the courts found
that where there were no statutory prohibitions, no interest was illegal
unless it was unconscionable and oppressive.52
During the period from the end of the Revolutionary War to the
Civil War, penalties for usury were gradually decreased. By the Civil
War the laws of most states provided only for a forfeiture of interest
if usury were proven.5" Interest rate ceilings, however, were generally
retained, and many businessmen believed that the usury laws set
rates which were unrealistic in the commercial world.54 Because of
this attitude, there was widespread evasion of usury provisions.
The discontent with the relatively low interest ceiling prodded
many businessmen to lobby vehemently for relief in their state legis-
latures.55 In 1866 the Florida Legislature recognized the oppressive
effect of usury laws on commerce and enacted a statute5 6 repealing all
previous usury laws. To loan or borrow money above the "legal" rate
of interest of 8 percent (8 percent had been set in a previous law
enacted that year) was no longer usurious.51 These provisions remained
in effect until at least 1881.58
In 1891 the Florida Legislature provided business opportunities
for illegal lenders by enacting a usury statute declaring "all contracts
for the payments of interest.., at a higher rate of interest than ten per
centum per annum" usurious.5 This law was replaced in 1909; the
51. Merriman & Hanks 7.
52. Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42 (1819), as cited in McConlogue, supra note 23, at
255.
53. ROBINSON & NUGENT 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. In 1867 Harmer Gilmer, Jr. was persuaded to author a dissertation against
usury laws. He described in scholarly terms the ill effect that these laws had on the
economy of the state of Virginia. However, unlike the effect of Jeremy Bentham's Letters,
this treatise failed to convince the Virginia legislature. Shanks, Practical Problems in the
Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. Rav. 327, 331 (1967).
56. The title and Preamble of the 1866 act stated:
AN ACT to untrammel Capital and to repeal all laws on Usury.
WHEREAS money, or its representatives, like other property and commodities
thrown upon market for sale or loan, should no more than these be trammeled
by law, but that an enlightened policy makes it judicious that its loan should
be left to the laws of demand and supply and to the sense of the mutual interest
of loaner and borrower;
Fla. Laws 1866, ch. 1562.
57. Fla. Laws 1866, ch. 1562. See Fla. Laws 1866, ch. 1483.
58. L. MCCLELLAN, A DIGEST OF THE LAws OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 585 (1881).
59. The penalty for taking, reserving, or charging interest over 10% per annum
was forfeiture of the interest. Therefore only the principal could be recovered by
the lender. Certain associations and holders of negotiable instruments under specified
circumstances were exempted from the application of this act. Fla. Laws 1891, ch. 4022.
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new law60 was similar but had two major additions: to be usurious,
the charging or reserving of a rate of interest had to be "willful,"61
and a taker of more than 25 percent interest forfeited principal as
well as interest.6 2 Since 1893 savings and loan associations have been
exempted from the usury laws. 63
In other states the usury laws continued to unbalance the money
market system. About 1870 the first truly professional, small loan
lenders appeared in Chicago and other midwest cities.64 This advent
of small loan lenders corresponded to the development in large
cities of a class of wage earners who needed additional money for
emergency and other expenses and who had enough earning potential
eventually to pay back the lender, whether he be legal or illegal.6 5 The
usury laws of this era, by placing an unreasonably low ceiling on rates,
drove those seeking small loans to illegal sources.
The growth of small loan lending continued; by 1900 nearly
every large city in the United States harbored loan companies briskly
loaning money at illegal rates.6 6 These loans, although usurious in
character, did perform a necessary economic function-usurious loans
were better than no loans at all. In Wisconsin, for example, around
1900 the "loan shark" (an excessive usurer) became. a considerable
emotional and economic problem.6 7 The usurer was condemned as a
"scoundrel," and the good citizens were morally outraged. In the face
of this, the usury law was strengthened, but, as usual, it had no real
effect on the "loan shark. '' 6
8
60. Fla. Laws 1909, ch. 5960.
61. Fla. Laws 1909, ch. 5960, § 3. Under the previous usury law the fact of taking
over 10% interest constituted a per se violation. Under the 1909 statute unless it was
"willfully" taken, the interest would not be a violation, i.e., the lender could show that
interest over 10% was charged due to inadvertence or mistake. However the lender
could not escape the penalties by pleading no intent to "exact usury" or "violate the
statute." The lender was charged with knowledge of the law, Coe v. Miller, 77 So. 88 (Fla.
1917). Caraballo, Discussion of the Usury Laws in the State of Florida Before the Hills-
borough County Bar Association, FLA. ST. B. Ass'N. L.J., June, 1929, at 7.
62. Fla. Laws 1909, ch. 5960, §5.
63. FLA. STAT. § 665.395 (1973). The same is true in Ohio. OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1151.361 (1972). See Stoddart & Hoover, Effect of Usury Laws on Home Ownership
Needs, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 49, 51-52 (1970). But see 12 U.S.C. § 1425 (1970), which renders
those exemptions nugatory if such associations wish membership in a Federal Home
Loan Bank. For a contemporary look at businessmen's views of the impact of usury
laws on a tight money market, see MyLod, The Mortgage Scene, HOUSE AND HOME
Jan., 1975, at 40.
64. ROBINSON & NUGENT 38, 42.
65. MIcHELMAN 106, 107.
66. MICHELMAN 108.
67. Friedman, The Usury Laws of Wisconsin: A Study in Legal and Social History,
1963 Wis. L. Ray. 515, 561.
68. Id.
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Except for remedial loan societies, the field of small loan lending
was preempted by the "loan sharks" until the early 1900's. 69 In reaction
to this "loan shark" monopoly, the Provident Loan Society, a "semi-
philanthropic remedial loan society," was organized in 1894 in New
York City.70 The motives behind its establishment were basically
charitable, but a reasonable profit was allowed and its interest rate
was set by law.71 New York soon permitted other remedial loan so-
cieties to be established. 72 The purpose of these societies was to drive
"loan sharks" out of the market by providing a reputable group of
lenders for those who needed financial assistance. It was presumed that
a legal, low-rate lender would drive out the "loan sharks. ' '7 3 While this
did not happen, Provident still survives today as the leader of the
pawnbroking business in New York.7 4
Studies of the "loan shark" problem75 were initiated by the Russell
Sage Foundation shortly after its incorporation in 1907.76 1910 marked
the end of an era during which small loan legislation was a nearly
organic reaction to the stimulus of loan sharking,77 and during which
lending to small borrowers was looked upon as anti-social if not il-
legal .7  A new attitude toward consumer loans was dawning, and
between 1911 and 1915 six states passed small loan laws.7 9 Utilizing
information gathered by its earlier studies, 0 the Foundation promul-
gated and recommended a uniform law in 1916.1
Ancillary to the small loan legislation movement, the first coopera-
tive credit society (credit union) was organized in New Hampshire
69. See CONSUMER CREDIT 15.
70. Friedman, supra note 67, at 563.
71. Id. at 563-64.
72. Id. at 563.
73. See D. GALLERT, W. HILBORN & G. MAY, SMALL LOAN LEGISLATION 22 (1932).
74. MICHELMAN 113, 114.
75. The two main studies were WASSAM, THE SALARY LOAN BUSINESS IN NEW YORK
CITY (1908) and HAM, THE CHATrEL LOAN BUSINESS (1909), as cited in Gisler, Legal and
Historical Background of Missouri Small Loan Problem, 16 Mo. L. REv. 207, 211 n.18
(1951).
76. The Foundation's title is somewhat of a misnomer. Mrs. Margaret Olivia Sage
actually founded the Russel Sage Foundation after Mr. Sage's death. Russel Sage himself
could hardly have been called a philanthropist; Fiorello H. La Guardia called him
"one of the meanest skinflints who ever lived." MICHELMAN 17-28.
77. D. GALLERT, W. HILBORN & G. MAY, supra note 73, at 53. Massachusetts was
an exception, in degree, to the general rule; in 1888 it enacted an inclusive small loan
act. Id. at 19.
78. ROBINSON & NUGET 95.
79. ROBINSON & NUGENT 118 (Massachusetts (1911), Oregon (1913), New Jersey
(1914), Ohio (1915), Pennsylvania (1915), and Michigan (1915)).
80. See note 75 supra.
81. For a thorough discussion of small loan laws and their development see
ROBINSON & NUGENT 113-17; Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small Loan
Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941).
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in 1909.82 The idea was not quickly accepted and the movement
faltered until E. A. Filene took up the cause.8 3 Thereafter, due in great'
part to Mr. Filene's effort, many states passed credit union acts, and
in 1934 the Federal Credit Union Act was enacted.8 4 By 1943, 41 states
had provisions for the establishment of credit unions.8 5
Various other methods of small loan lending were yet to be tried.
Around 1910 a Norfolk, Virginia, attorney, Arthur L. Morris, originat-
ed the concept of lending that became known as the Morris Plan. 6
Understandably, the institutions using the plan were usually dubbed
"Morris Plan banks." But they were also called industrial or industrial
savings banks, which are misnomers because the banks were consumer
credit oriented. They were intended to fill the consumer void left by
commercial banks which at that time did not make personal loans.8 7
To operate within the confines of the traditional 6 percent rate limita-
tion, Morris formulated an ingenious scheme: 8 by discounting the
interest and by requiring the borrower to deposit with the lender
in a noninterest-bearing savings account one-twelfth of the original
principal per month, or to purchase the equivalent amount of in-
vestment certificates from the lender, the effective interest rate was
nearly doubled. 9 Florida began regulating industrial banks by statute
in 1929 and allowed a maximum effective interest rate of 20 percent. 0
A reaction to the general usury laws by savings and commercial
banks began as a specialized loan service around 1928 at the National
City Bank of New York."1 Florida in 1941 authorized special loans not
in excess of $1,500 to be made by non-Morris Plan banks at a 6 percent
per annum discount rate computed on the total amount of the loan.9 2
82. CONSUMER CREDIT 37. But see Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Con-
sumer Instalment Credit, 66 MicH. L. REV. 81, 84 (1967) (citing Massachusetts as the
first).
83. CONSUMER CREDIT 37.
84. Id. at 37-38. The Act is presently 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-90 (1970).
85. CONSUMER CrDIT 37. Florida enacted its credit union statute in 1929 authorizing
1% per month to be charged. Fla. Laws 1929, ch. 14499.
86. Holz, The Regulation of Consumer Credit, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 449, 454.
87. CONSUMER CREDIT 31.
88. MIcHELMAN 197-98.
89. Id. See also Collins & Ham 405-06; Danforth, Usury: Applicability to Collateral
Fees and Charges, 16 S. DAR. L. REV. 52, 69-70 (1971); Gisler, supra note 75, at 217-20;
Pearce & Williams 254-58; Penick, The Impact of Usury Law on Banks in Arkansas, 8
ARK. L. REV. 420, 437, 450-51 (1954).
90. Fla. Laws 1935, ch. 16791, § 4. For a discussion of the present rate provision
see p. 202 infra.
91. CONSUMER CREDIT 45. For an interesting anecdote see Dellmuth, Banking's op-
portunity To Service the Small Loan Needs of the Public, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
115, 116-17 (1954).
92. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20940, §§ 1-3. This limitation has been raised to $5,000.
FLA. STAT. § 659.18 (1973).
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Since the payments could be made in monthly installments and addi-
tional charges up to 2 percent were authorized, a return of about
15.25 percent was possible.9 3
By 1938 the Uniform Small Loan Law with some modifications
was enacted in 24 states; three other states used the uniform law as a
model but almost modified it to death.94 In 1925 Florida adopted the
fourth draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law with an added exemption
for bonafide purchasers of choses in action. The Florida statute was
not applicable in counties with populations less than 40,000,1s and
no mention was made of wage purchasing.9 6 These weaknesses were
eliminated by amendment in 194197 after a vicious battle between the
organized, syndicated, unlicensed lenders and the advocates of effec-
tive small loan legislation.98 After the 1941 amendments, the Act re-
mained basically unchanged " until the 1973 legislative session, except
for an increase in the maximum allowable loanoo and a change in
the rate structure.10 1
In 1949 the Florida Consumer Finance Law was enacted' 0 2 creat-
93. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20940, §§ 1-3.
94. CONSUMER CREDIT 16.
95. Fla. Laws 1925, ch. 10177, § 19. The population limitation further encouraged
the loan shark to operate in the less populous areas where enforcement of usury laws
would seemingly be lax and where legitimate sources of loans would be scarce.
96. Section 16 of the Uniform Small Loan Act was omitted from the Florida act.
The wage buying technique, which offered a way to extract high rates of interest
without violating loan laws, evolved as the result of delayed payments of earned wages.
The delayed payment created a chose in action which could easily be discounted and
not fall within the confines of the Florida act. Hubachek, supra note 81, at 121. For
further discussion of wage buying see pp. 189-90 infra.
97. The population limitation was excluded by Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20728, § 6. The
inclusion of wage buying within the sphere of the Small Loan Act was accomplished
by Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20209. This law stated:
[T]he laws of the State relating to the regulation of the business of lending
money and to interest charges and usury are being evaded . . . by the guise of
purchasing the wages [and] salaries . . . at discounts far exceeding the rates of
interest permitted by law . . . [and] such transactions in substance and effect
amount to loans for all practical purposes and the evil of such exorbitant dis-
counts is equivalent to the evil of usurious interest charges.
98. Kilgore, Legislative Tactics of Unregulated Lenders, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
173, 174 (1941). "[A] moral stigma attached to any small loan and to both parties to it.
As for the lender, the public did not know the difference between licensed lender and
loan shark .... As for the borrower, public opinion generally condemned any borrowing
by him as immoral." Smith, What Lies Ahead in the Field of Small Loans, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 120, 121 (1954).
99. Some interim modifications of the Act dealt with licensing and investigating
procedures. See Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201; Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 24869; Fla. Laws 1941,
ch. 20728.
100. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 9.
101. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-201, § 10.
102. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25343. For additional commentary on the Consumer Finance
Law, see Oeltjen 378-79.
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ing a dual system of small loan laws in Florida. The Consumer
Finance Law was almost identical to the original Small Loan Act
except for the method utilized to compute interest and charges.103 The
effective interest rate which could be charged under the Consumer
Finance Law, however, was several percent less than that authorized
by the Small Loan Law. 104 When both acts were amended in 1957
some of the discrepancy was eliminated.05
The most recent revisions of the Florida small loan laws occurred
during the 1973 legislative session. After a heated and drawn-out
process," 6 on June 1, 1973, the bill amending the Small Loan Act
was finally forwarded to the Governor's office where it became law
without his signature.107 With the 1973 amendments, Florida again
has only one small loan statute, the 1949 Consumer Finance Law
having been repealed.108 The new, all inclusive statute, named the
"Florida Consumer Finance Act,"'1 9 adds several consumer protections
and provides for a maximum rate of 30 percent. 10
B. Sales Credit and Credit Cards
Retail credit is not a new phenomenon. Since colonial days"'
farmers have been extended credit from crop to crop, and, as is still
done in many rural and urban areas today, the finance charge was
built into the price of the goods sold. This method of extending credit
is usually termed book, or open account, credit, and is based mainly
on the creditors' experience with the borrower. Installment buying also
existed in the colonies. 1 2 Commodities were sold on the installment
plan as early as 1807. Singer widely sold sewing machines using this
method beginning in the middle 1800's." 3 Volume of sales credit
increased with the advent of selling automobiles on the installment
plan around 1910.114
103. See Oeltjen 379-87.
104. Compare Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25343, § 8, with Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25343, § 14.
105. Compare Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-164, § 5, with Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26484, § 10.
106. FLA. S. JotrR. 569 (1973). See also Oeltjen 378.
107. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 16.
108. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 15.
109. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-192, § 1.
110. For a comprehensive discussion of the Florida Consumer Finance Act see
Oeltjen.
111. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 5.
112. For example, a colonial cabinet maker, David Evans, sold over 9/10ths of his
goods on credit. M. NEIFELD, NEIFELD'S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 16 (1961), as cited
in CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 5.
113. CONSUMER CREDIT 58. For a short history of installment buying see R. BABSON,
THE FOLLY OF INSTALLMENT BUYING 18-22 (1938).
114. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 5.
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As previously shown, creditors throughout this period felt
hampered by usury laws, and much of their history is a chronicle of
how to avoid the usury laws-legally or illegally. Those who granted
credit through the sales of goods, however, were not as restricted by
usury laws. 115 The "time price doctrine," discussed later in this article,
allowed retail merchants to avoid usury laws and extract a greater
return than allowed by law. Nonetheless, certain aspects of retail credit
were successfully challenged as usurious practices.""
In reaction to consumer discontent concerning the use and abuse
of the time price doctrine in installment selling of automobiles,'11 7 the
Florida Legislature in 1957 enacted the comprehensive Motor Vehicles
Sales Finance Act."' The Act specified maximum rates for automobile
finance charges that ranged from 14.5 percent to 30 percent, depending
on the model year of the automobile." 9 In 1959, the legislature passed
the Retail Installment Sales Act, 20 which limited the rate of finance
charge on installment sales contracts for other consumer goods and
services 12 ' and revolving charge accounts to an effective rate of 18
percent per year.
1 2
The use of credit cards and revolving charge accounts is a fairly
recent phenomenon. Certain department stores, petroleum dis-
tributors, and retail gasoline outlets used this form of credit as early
as the 1910's, but the introduction of modern revolving credit is
usually attributed to Wanamaker's of Philadelphia in the 1930's.12a
115. R. NUGENT, CONSUMER CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 57 (1938).
116. See pp. 186-87 infra.
117. Hausler, Contracts, 12 U. MIAMI L. REv. 405 (1958).
118. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-799.
119. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-799, § 7.
120. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-414.
121. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-414, § 2(7) defined retail installment contract as "an
instrument or instruments reflecting one or more retail installment transactions entered
into in this state pursuant to which goods or services may be paid for in installments.
It does not include a revolving account or an instrument reflecting a sale pursuant
thereto." Currently this is FLA. STAT. § 520.31(7) (1973).
122. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-414, § 5(4)(a): "ten dollars ($10.00) per one hundred
dollars ($100.00) per year." Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-414, § 6(3): "a time price differential
which shall not exceed fifteen cents (150) per ten dollars ($10.00) per month ....
Revolving account was defined as:
an instrument or instruments prescribing the terms of retail installment trans-
actions which may be made thereafter from time to time pursuant thereto,
under which the buyer's total unpaid balance thereunder, whenever incurred,
is payable in installments over a period of time and under the terms of which
a time price differential is to be computed in relation to the buyer's unpaid
balance from time to time.
Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-414, § 2(8) (§ 520.31(8)).
123. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 203; Moller & Warren, A Report on the Re-
vision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1974).
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In the 1960's banks entered the credit card field. In response to this,
the Florida Legislature enacted in 1969 a 1.5 percent per month (18
percent per year) rate ceiling for bank cards.'24
C. Recent Developments
The exceptional growth of credit has resulted in and from hodge-
podge legislation and judicially recognized exceptions to the usury
laws. 2 5 The resulting confusion stimulated studies, such as the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation's in-depth study of consumer credit in the 1960's,1"1
and proposed model legislation, such as the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code 27 and National Consumer Act.
128
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter referred to as
the U3C) is proposed uniform legislation first presented for adoption
by the states in 1968. It is the result of approximately five years of
concentrated study by a special committee, a substantial staff of drafts-
men and experts, and advice from numerous advisers and consultants
drawn from both industry and consumer interests. The U3C, intended
to provide a comprehensive, integrated law in the area of credit,
12 9
was molded in the pattern of the Uniform Commercial Code. Its
coverage includes both consumer and non-consumer credit sales and
loans.
1 30
The U3C, financed in large part by the credit industry, has been
strongly lobbied by the credit industry as a whole and some national
small loan companies in particular. 1 However, it has been opposed by
segments of the banking and small loan industries. Opposition to the
U3C by consumer groups has been vehement."x 2 Much of the consumer
unrest emanates from the presence of industry financing and support; 3
the code is alleged to be pro-creditor, complicated, and excessively
bulky.34 Because of the heavy criticism and scant enactment-only
124. FLA. STAT. § 659.181 (1973).
125. See pp. 184-96 infra.
126. Graham, The U3C: A Perspective and a Summary, 42 FLA. B.J. 1043, 1044
(1968).
127. See generally UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note.
128.. See generally NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT, Prefatory Note.
129. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note.
130. Id.
131. Shick, Storm Warnings: A "Revised" UCCC, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 463 (1972).
See also NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT, Prefatory Note.
132. See, e.g., Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1, 12-13 (1969); Shick, supra note 131; A Consumer Credit Code . . . for lenders,
1969 CONSUMER REP. 129; NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT, Prefatory Note.
133. Shick, supra note 131; A Consumer Credit Code .. . for lenders, supra note
132. See also St. Petersburg Times, March 8, 1972, § B, at 1-B.
134. Shick, supra note 131; A Consumer Credit Code . . . for lenders, supra note 132.
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seven states have adopted it to date-it is now in its fifth redraft. The
redrafts are more consumer oriented, less complex, and more con-
cise. 115
In Florida, the U3C was first introduced in the House in 1969,
where it died in committee. It was reintroduced, in either or both
the Senate and House, in each succeeding year through 1973, but
never reported out of committee.,3 In 1974 it was informally con-
sidered by a House committee but never introduced.
In response to the U3C the National Consumer Law Center
produced a model code entitled the National Consumer Act (herein-
after referred to as the NCA).13 7 The NCA is considerably more con-
sumer oriented than the older drafts of the USC, 38 but its future is
uncertain, especially in light of the U3C redrafts. Many provisions
of the NCA were considered by Florida legislative committees as
alternatives to the U3C, and they directly influenced some provisions
of Florida's Consumer Finance Act.139
Although at one time usury was defined as the charging of any
interest, 40 today charging interest is considered usurious only if it
exceeds set limits and fulfills certain other requisites.
Usury is an affirmative defense which must be proven by clear and
satisfactory evidence. The Florida courts on more than one occasion
have stated that there are four elements in a usurious transaction,
each of which must be established. First, there must be a loan,
express or implied; second, an understanding between the parties
that the money loaned is to be returned; third, payment or agree-
ment to pay a greater rate of interest than is allowed by law; and,
finally a corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate for the use
of the money loaned.'1'
135. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note to Working Redraft No.
4 (Dec. 1972).
136. JOINT LEGiSLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITEE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1969
REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE H. 104, S. 246 (undated); JOINT LEGISLATIVE
MANAGEMENT COMMITrEE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1970 REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE S. 4 (undated); JOINT LEISLAAIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, HISTORY OF
LEGISLATION-1971 REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE S. 246 (undated); JOINT LEGIS-
LATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1972 REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE H. 252-53, S. 326-27 (undated); JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITrEE,
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION-1973 REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE S. 147 (undated).
137. The National Consumer Act has been adopted by Wisconsin. Wisconsin Con-
sumer Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-427.105 (1974).
138. Shick, supra note 131; NATIONAL. CONSUMER AcT, Prefatory Note, supra note 131.
139. See generally Oeltjen.
140. See note 19 supra.
141. Anderson, Tight-Money Real Estate Financing and the Florida Usury Statute,
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Each requisite provides an opportunity for innovation in methods of
avoidance or evasion. Several examples of these "innovations" follow.
III. METHODS USED To AvOID USURY LAWS
To counter restrictive rates mandated by most state laws, debtors
and creditors, courts and legislatures created or countenanced what
one author has referred to as "escape valves."' 142 Those created by the
parties to the transaction are catalogued as either evasions or
avoidances. The only difference I can discern between the two
categories is that an avoidance is an evasion that succeeded, or an eva-
sion is an avoidance that failed. One of the least successful attempts
to avoid the usury laws was by contract. Contractual waivers have not
been recognized in the field of usury. 43 The most successful and wide-
spread avoidances are the corporate exception and the time price
doctrine. 4 4
A. The Corporate Exception
Volume-wise, the largest exception to the general usury laws is
the "corporate,"' 5 or "commercial," exception' 4  This may include,
24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 642, 645 (1970). See also Harrell, Mortgage Investments and the
Usury Problem, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 343 (1961); Hershman 336; Lowell, A Current
Analysis of the Usury Laws: A National View, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 193, 195-218 (1971);
Editorial, Usury and Small Loan Legislation, 17 MARQUETTE L. REV. 60, 61-62 (1932).
142. Shanks, supra note 55, at 331.
143. Merriman & Hanks 16 & n.80; Penick, supra note 89, at 436.
144. The case most often cited as the beginning of the time price doctrine is
Bette v. Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827). The American counterpart is Hogg
v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). For Florida cases discussing and upholding
the doctrine see, e.g., Dillon v. J. W. Walter, Inc., 98 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1957); Nelson
v. Scarritt Motors, 48 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1950); Midstate Homes v. Stairres, 161 So. 2d
569 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The doctrine has also received more than adequate
treatment in the journals. See, e.g., Berger, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 148 (1935); Collins & Ham, 401-05, 408-12; Ecker, Commentary on "Usury
in Installment Sales," 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1935); Penick, supra note 89;
Robertson, Myth and Reality in Consumer Credit Rate Regulation, 43 Miss. L.J. 429,
437-38 (1972); Note, Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit Sales, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1958); Note, Retail Credit Sales and Usury, 24 LA. L. REV. 822
(1964); Note, Credit Sales At a Price in Excess of the Cash Sale Price as a Violation of
the Usury Laws, 12 NEB. L. BULL. 370 (1934); Note, Applicability of Usury Laws to
Credit Installment Sales, 4 S CAR. L.Q. 290, 290-93 (1951); Note, Usury and Revolving
Credit: The Old Law and the New Economics, 15 S. DAK. L. REV. 304 (1970); Note,
Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 YALE L.J. 1219 (1951); Note, Usury
Statutes and Installment, 48 YALE L.J. 1102 (1939); Comment, Credit Sales at a Price in
Excess of the Cash Sale Price as a Violation of the Usury Laws, 39 YALE L.J. 408 (1930);
49 MicH. L. REv. 1087 (1951).
145. States where there is no law allowing corporations the right to use the de-
fense of usury are: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massa-
chusetts (no limit on contract rate of interest), Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire (no
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or be in addition to, an exemption for transactions in excess of a cer-
tain amount; Florida, for example, applies its 15 percent corporate
rate to all loans exceeding $500,000.147 The rationale behind such ex-
ceptions is quite simple: the exemption is granted where the debtors
are thought quite able to protect themselves. "The need for regula-
tion is much more apparent in the consumer field, and in the writer's
opinion, problems in commercial and consumer lending are inherent-
ly different. '"14s
While a business borrower of particularly poor judgment might
well agree to repay a loan at a rate of interest which his business
cannot afford, such a businessman might also purchase inferior
materials, sign a particularly disadvantageous lease, or employ dis-
honest employees .... Furthermore, it is reasonable to presume that
an interest rate which a knowledgeable business borrower agrees
to pay has been fairly negotiated between equal parties in the same
manner as a businessman negotiates other contractual provisions.1 4
Finally, "by releasing the corporation, which is the prime vehicle of
industry and commerce, from this restraint lenders are more willing
limit on contract rate of interest), North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and
Wyoming. Jurisdictions where corporations do not have the defense of usury are:
Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois (any interest rate may be charged on any
business loan), Iowa, Kansas (unless principal asset of corporation is one- or two-family
dwelling), Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland (any business loan over $5,000), Michigan (also
lawful to extend interest at any rate to "business entities," by any national chartered
bank or insurance carrier), Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York (unless principal asset is a one- or two-family dwelling and corporation
formed within six months before loan giving lien on dwelling), Ohio, Oklahoma (no
business corporation), Pennsylvania, South Carolina (if $40,000 or more capital stock
issued), South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. In the following states,
the defense of usury is subject to the corporate rate: Alabama (no defense on loans over
$100,000), Arizona, Florida, Georgia (no defense on loans over $2,500), Idaho, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oregon (no defense on transactions over $50,000), Texas. In the follow-
ing states the defense is subject to a transactional amount: Hawaii (no defense on
contracts or notes over $750,000), Washington (no defense for corporations, Massa-
chusetts trusts, associations or limited partnerships on loans or real estate develop-
ment over $100,000). The defense of usury is given to corporations in California and
Tennessee. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT § 510 (1974).
146. See Harrell, supra note 141, at 353-54; Hershman 339-40; Hershman, supra
note 3, at 1132-34; Katz, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REv. 51
(1962); Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEX. L. REv. 419,
438-41 (1971); Merriman & Hanks 8-12; Podell, The Application of Usury Laws to
Modern Real Estate Transactions, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 136, 138-42 (1972); Prather,
Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAw. 181, 194-95 (1960); Note, Incorpora-
tion to Avoid the Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1968).
147. FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (1973).
148. Loiseaux, supra note 146, at 420. See Katz, supra note 146, at 55.
149. Merriman & Hanks 15-16.
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to risk their capital on corporate ventures and commerce is in-
creased."'15 0 But "corporate borrowers are not really different from
noncorporate borrowers. . . .After all, if it is ipso facto wrong and
oppressive-as a matter of legislative policy-to charge a necessitous
borrower more than six percent, it is no better to charge a sophisti-
cated corporation more.'1'
Once the constitutionality of such an exemption was established,'
1 52
attention and litigation focused on whether the corporation was for
a "business purpose" or was in substance only an illegal method or
device for circumventing the usury restrictions on loans to in-
dividuals. 1 53 In light of this line of cases it would seem reasonable
to revise the corporate exemption to make it a business exception.
"[T]here is really no reason why someone should not be able to
borrow money in the course of business at any rate of interest which he
feels the state of his business will permit him to pay."' 5 4 In this regard
it should make little difference if the debtor is incorporated or not.
B. The Time Price Doctrine
The time price doctrine is a very simple device by which the
parties can avoid the application of usury laws. The seller of a piece
or item of property quotes two prices to the buyer-one contemplating
cash and one envisioning payment over a period of time. The difference
between the two is known as the time price differential.'5 5 The usury
laws are frequently inapplicable because the transaction is a sale, not
a "loan or forbearance of money" to which usury laws traditionally
apply. 56 In defense of the doctrine it is said that it "was not deviously
150. Katz, supra note 146, at 55.
151. Shanks, supra note 55, 347-48 (1967). See Merriman & Hanks 10-12.
152. E.g., 759 Riverside Ave. v. Marvin, 147 So. 848 (Fla. 1933). See 29 Micli. L. REv.
107 (1930) (discussing constitutionality of a statute which exempts corporations from
usury law).
153. The recent Florida cases on this point are collected and discussed in Ander-
son, supra note 141, at 664-68; Hadlow & Legler, Florida's General Usury Law, 44 FLA.
B.J. 570-72 (1970). See also Shanks, supra note 55, at 344-50; Note, Usury, Inc.-In-
corporation to Avoid Usury Laws, 7 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375 (1953).
154. Merriman & Hanks 15. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974).
155. E.g., in the sale of an automobile the seller would quote a cash price of $2,000
but if the buyer wanted to pay for it over two years he could do so for a price of
$2,400 at the rate of $100 per month. The time price differential would then be $400
($2,400-$2,000).
156. See, e.g., Note, Applicability of Usury Laws to Credit Installment Sales, 4 S.
CAR. L.Q. 290, 293 (1951), and cases cited therein. See also Morrison v. McKinnon, 12
Fla. 552 (1869) (compensation for loan or forbearance of other than money is not
regulated by usury statute-an exaction of 100 bushels of beans for loan of 30 bushels,
not usury).
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invented for use in installment sales of the new forms of personal
property, but had originated respectably in 19th-century cases related
to land sale. ' ' 157 As one can see with a casual perusal of the cited
articles, the merits of the doctrine have already been thoroughly de-
bated; this article, therefore, will not address them further.
In two collateral areas, the time price doctrine has not been
faring well of late. The first is the situation where the seller "dis-
counts," or sells, the buyer's obligation-chattel paper-to a bank,
sales finance company, or other financier. 15 The other area of recent
concern is the revolving charge account.1 59
The merits of the time price doctrine are evident. First, it pro-
vides a method by which property can be sold on credit where strict
adhesion to the usury limitation would make such sales highly un-
economical. 160 Second, it is a gray market, a substitute for loan sharks,
"whenever the urgency of the borrower's needs requires the purchase
of durable goods.""' And third, criticism of its abuses cleared the
way for adoption of the retail installment acts . 62
C. Option To Repurchase, Sale-leaseback, and
"Wrap-around" Mortgage
Other avoidances (or evasions) utilizing sales, found mostly in
business contexts, are a sale with option to repurchase 163 and a sale-
157. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 445, 452 (1968).
158. See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen, 495 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1972),
commented on in 48 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1973) (seller viewed as agent of bank); Peterson
v. Philco Finance Corp., 428 P. 2d 961 (Idaho 1967) (financier's "rewrite" of obligation
not within time price doctrine). See generally, Prather, supra note 146, at 193-94; Note,
Judicial and Legislative Treatment of "Usurious" Credit Sales, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1143,
1146-47 (1958).
159. See, e.g., State v. J. C. Penney Co., 179 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1970), commented
on in 2 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L. REV. 234 (1971) (revolving charge not within time
price doctrine); State ex. rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973),
commented on in 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (1974) (revolving charge accounts fall under
Iowa usury law); Note, Service Charges for Revolving Charge Accounts: A Time Price
Doctrine or Usury?, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 905 (1971); Note, Interest Incognito-Usury
Statute Applied to Revolving Charge Agreement, 34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 54 (1972) (dis-
cussing Rollinger v. J. C. Penney Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S. Dak. 1971) (nonapplicability
of time price doctrine to revolving accounts)). See generally Driver, Retail Revolving
Credit and the Usury Statutes, 20 PEas. FINArcE L.Q. 24 (1965), advocating applying the
time price doctrine even to revolving charge accounts. (At the time he wrote the
article, Mr. Driver was assistant general counsel of the J. C. Penney Company.)
160. See Kripke, supra note 157, at 452-53. See generally, Shanks, supra note 55.
161. Shay, A Portrait of the Consumer Credit Market, 26 Bus. LAW. 761, 767-68
(1971).
162. Kripke, supra note 157. For a discussion of Florida's retail installment act, see
notes 261-63 and accompanying text inIra.
163. See Collins & Ham 407-08; Comment, Evasion and Avoidance of Florida Usury
Laws, 5 MiAmi L.Q. 493, 496 (1951).
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leaseback transaction. 6 4 Both allow a higher return than that per-
mitted by the usury limitation. In both situations, the borrower "sells"
property to the lender and is either given an option to buy it back at
a price slightly above what the seller received plus the highest legal
contract rate of interest, 165 or the borrower leases the property back at
rates which, when added to the lease redemption charge, will be above
the price received plus the highest legal contract rate of interest.
The "wrap-around" mortgage is another technique that the seller
or lender may utilize to increase revenue.
The "wrap-around" mortgage is a subsequent and subordinate
mortgage secured by real property upon which there exists a first
mortgage which remains outstanding and unsatisfied. The wrap-
around mortgage differs from a conventional second mortgage in
that it entails a special agreement between the parties for payment
of the first mortgage obligation by the lender, and consequently,
the principal of the wrap-around loan is the sum of the outstanding
indebtedness on the first mortgage and the new funds advanced.
When the wrap-around mortgage is executed at an interest rate
which exceeds the contractual rate of the first mortgage, it be-
comes possible for the lender to increase his effective interest yield
from the overall transaction. The benefits to be derived from the
use of wrap-around financing, therefore, can be realized primarily
in a period of rising interest rates. 166
D. Discounting Negotiable Paper
Discounting negotiable paper or other obligations is another
method of avoiding usury limitations.167 One author describes the
procedure and problems as follows:
Where the original borrower absorbs a discount of such [an] amount
that the maximum legal rate is exceeded when the discount is
added to the contract rate, usury results. Where, however, the
original borrower receives the proceeds of the loan at par (or at
such lesser amount which translated into a rate of interest and then
164. See Anderson, supra note 141, at 648-58, Podell, supra note 146, at 145-47.
165. See, e.g., Zmistowski v. Oxley, 161 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (deed
absolute with option back found to be sale not loan, hence not within usury pro-
hibitions). See also Hadlow & Legler, supra note 153, at 573-74, for a recent discussion
of these transactions.
166. Note, Wrap-around Financing: A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws?,
1972 DuKE L.J. 785, 787. See Podell, supra note 146, at 147-48.
167. See Collins & Ham 419; Danforth, supra note 89, at 66; Hershman 347-51. For
a good summary of the problems in computing the rate of interest charges, see Pearce
& Williams 237-38.
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added to the contract rate does not exceed the maximum legal rate)
and the loan is then purchased at a discount, no usury results be-
cause the transaction is not a loan but a purchase. Unfortunately,
the factual situations in which these principles are applied are not
so easily placed into the different categories. 16 8
A Florida example of this problem is Dante v. Givens,6 9 where
plaintiff held a $6,800 note and mortgage. He agreed to assign it to
the defendant for $3,000 and a promise that the defendant would,
after a period of time, assign it back upon payment of $3,600. The
court held that the transaction was not the sale of a mortgage but
was a loan and subject to the usury laws. 01
E. The Wage Purchase
One of the most prevalent methods used to skirt the usury laws
as they applied to consumers was a salary or wage purchase.171
The "salary purchaser," so called, advances the employee a sum of
money and takes in return only an assignment of a portion of the
employee's wages covering the advanced amount and usually ten
percent in addition. The "purchaser" takes no obligation from the
seller of the wage-only the assignment. The device is obvious and
it is believed that most courts would declare the transaction no matter
what its form a loan of money. 72
A common practice in unregulated territory in the South takes the
form of a sale by the borrower to the lender of his next pay check,
which he agrees to buy back at [the] next pay day with a premium.
If he cannot pay the whole amount on the appointed day he must
sell another pay check. This process goes on from week to week,
often for years on end. Salary buying was especially flagrant in
Georgia. The charge there was usually $1 on each $10. The borrow-
er must go on renewing his agreement and paying his premium
until such time as he could find enough cash to discharge the
principal with the premium."7 3
168. Hershman 347.
169. 156 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963), discussed in Boyer & Berger, Real
Property Law, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 313, 322 (1965).
170. 156 So. 2d at 14. See Boyer & Berger, supra note 169, at 322.
171. See Collins & Ham 417-18; Gisler, supra note 75, at 210, 213-14; Hilborn, The
Small Loan Act, 14 A.B.A.J. 581, 583 (1928); 15 MINN. L. REV. 467 (1931) (discussing
the constitutionality of an Ohio statute classifying salary purchases as loans).
172. Hilborn, supra note 171, at 583.
173. Kelso, Social and Economic Background of the Small Loan Problem, 16 Mo. L.
REv. 197, 202 (1951).
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The purchase or assignment of "wages, salary, commissions or
other compensation for services" of $600 or less has been brought
under Florida's usury provisions. 17 4 Furthermore, the legality of such
a sale or assignment, even for security, in Florida is open to question.'75
F. The Collateral Advantage Doctrine
The collateral advantage doctrine was designed to deal with an-
other series of contrived variances to usury restrictions. "The general
rule is that a collateral transaction between the borrower and lender
under which the lender may earn a profit will not render the trans-
action usurious, if entered into in good faith and without an intent
to exact usury.' ' 176 This rule might be applied, for example, where,
in addition to legal interest, (1) the lender was "hired" by the borrow-
er as a financial advisor but did no work;1 7 7 (2) the debtor was re-
quired to lease unneeded space from the lender;178 or (3) the borrow-
er was required to buy a $10 merchandise coupon good for face value
on all purchases over $40 made from the lender. 79
A prevalent form of this "tie-in" arrangement in consumer trans-
actions is the sale of credit life, accident and health, or other forms
of insurance. 8 Among cash lenders it is not unusual to find that 95
to 98 percent of the borrowers have purchased insurance from or
through the creditor.'8 ' This saturation coupled with the belief that
insurance is an improper method of raising lender revenues has
brought near condemnation by many writers. 8 2 The practice is said
to be bad for several reasons, not the least of which is the tendency
to mask the true cost of the credit transaction 83 Unlike many prices
174. FLA. STAT. § 516.26 (1973).
175. See FLA. STAT. § 516.17 (1973).
176. Pearce & Williams 252. See generally Loiseaux, supra note 146, at 434-35.
177. Collins & Ham 418.
178. Id. at 419.
179. Penick, supra note 89, at 437.
180. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 83-89; Davis, Etter, Blythe & Freund, The
Regulation of Consumer Credit Insurance, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 718 (1968). See
generally Birkhead, Murray & Lochmoeller, Illegal Lending in Missouri, 16 Mo. L.
REV. 251, 262-66 (1951); Hubachek, The Drift Toward a Consumer Credit Code, 16 U.
Cm. L. REV. 609, 620-22 (1949); Oeltjen 391-95; Pearce & Williams 239-40.
181. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 86.
182. See, e.g., Davis, Etter, Blythe & Freund, supra note 180; Hubachek, Progress
and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 18-21
(1954); Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 298, 332-37
(1969); Note, Consumer Credit Insurance-A need for Regulation in Kentucky, 56 Ky.
L.J. 668 (1968); Note Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-The Case for the Consumer,
49 Tax. L. REV. 1011, 1036-49 (1971).
183. "[E]ven . . . informed debtors have no real alternatives in selecting coverage
and are in a vastly inferior bargaining position vis-a-vis the creditor. In addition, the
USURY: UTILITARIAN OR USELESS?
which are virtually unregulated, insurance premiums are not subject
to competition but are influenced by a type of "reverse competition":
the creditor sells the brand of insurance which carries the highest
legal price because he profits in direct proportion to the size of
premium collected.18
4
Because of the potential for coercion in a situation where the
creditor can both "sell"'185 insurance and require its purchase,18" cer-
tain protective measures have been legislatively enacted. For example,
under Truth in Lending if the creditor requires the purchase of
credit life or disability insurance as a prerequisite to the granting of
credit, it must be included in the "finance charge."'18 7 In Florida the
sale by a creditor-seller of certain types of insurance is subject to the
anti-coercion statute that, while reinforcing the right to require in-
surance, prohibits the specification of any particular agent, solicitor, or
insurer. 88 However, a Consumer Finance Act licensee "can sell credit
life and disability insurance ... and can condition the grant of credit
on the purchase of such insurance from an employee or associate of the
licensee.''189 While the National Consumer Act would forbid the
creditor any advantage from the insurance sale other than having the
risk insured, 190 the Uniform Small Loan Act prohibits any charge in
addition to the permitted interest.' 91
Proposals to prevent the creditor from profiting on the sale of
insurance have been criticized on two fronts. First, if the profit in-
centive is removed, fewer creditors may sell insurance and unit costs
will probably rise-credit insurance may well be more expensive on a
nonprofit basis than it is on a profit basis. 9 ' Second, without the
revenue from credit insurance operations, consumer finance companies
would have a reduction in profit. 9 3 Reductions of profit would in turn
relatively insignificant cost of the added insurance service discourages debtors from
engaging in intense price shopping." CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 86.
184. Id. at 85-86; Copenhaver, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 71 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1968).
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 626.321(1)(a), (e) (1973).
186. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 516.20(1) (1973).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1970).
188. FLA. STAT. § 626.960 (1973).
189. Oeltjen 393.
190. NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 4.110(11).
191. Seventh Draft of the Uniform Small Loan Law § 13(c) in B. CURRAN, TRENDS
IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 153 (1965).
192. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 86.
193. "[T]he revenue from credit insurance accounts for 15 percent of the net
operating profit of consumer finance companies and that almost 40 percent of premiums
on credit insurance are returned to the lender in the form of commissions and
dividends .... ." Goudzwaard, The Economic Impact of Credit Insurance Charges, 36
J. RISK & INS. 515, 522 (1969). See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 86.
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prompt a cutback in expenses, which would take the form of a re-
duction of credit extended to borrowers in the marginal risk
category.'94
A study done in the State of Washington following the enactment
of a law lowering interest rates from 18 percent to 12 percent reported
that "[r]etailers, and particularly automobile dealers, also compensated
for their decline in income on credit transactions by selling more of
their customers credit life, credit health, and accident insurance
policies."' 19 5 There was an increase of 23 percent in credit health and
life insurance from automobile sales in 1969 in Washington, while
the rise in other states was negligible. 96
The cited article discusses other reasons for the increase in sales
of insurance. First, if the consumer who has credit health in-
insurance becomes sick or disabled, the insurance company will make
the payments. By ensuring the repayment of more loans, the creditor
can offer more credit on better terms because of his lower risks of de-
fault. Second, insurance makes the contract "between the merchant
and the consumer more salable to financial institutions." It allows
the creditor to get more money when he discounts the note. The
secondary effect is, of course, an increase in the availability of credit
at lower terms.'97
Arkansas also provides an example of this problem.
The Little Rock lenders, especially the loan company officials,
were quick to point out their need to employ the credit insurance
sale as a revenue-producing device-either for the lender's com-
mission as agent for an independent insurer or for the profit on
the premium in cases where the lender is its own insurer. On the
other hand, many of the Champaign-Urbana lenders, particularly
the banks, regard insurance simply as added security for payment.
Not only are the insurance charges higher in Arkansas, but the
Little Rock lenders to some extent use property insurance solely
as a revenue producing device. For example, several of the Little
Rock loan companies often attempt to acquire a security interest
194. "If insurance were eliminated or if the premiums were reduced sharply, then
in order to maintain credit availability at present levels, it seems likely that rate ceilings
would have to rise or other solutions must be sought, such as loans guaranteed by
government agencies." Goudzwaard, supra note 193, at 523. "Indeed it might be that
cash lenders, under such circumstances, would not only discontinue offering insurance
services but cease or severely restrict offering financing services as well." CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE U.S. 86.
195. Wheatley & Gordon, Regulating the Price of Consumer Credit, 35 J. MARKET-
ING 21, 24-25 (1971).
196. Id.
197. Id.
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in the household furnishings of the borrower simply in order to
justify imposing an insurance premium which varies among the
lenders from $1.00 per thousand valuation to $2.50 per hundred
valuation.119
G. Choice of Laws
Nonuniformity among state laws that define and penalize usury
creates an advantage for the parties who can "forum shop."' 99 Dis-
cussions of the cases involving whether debtors and creditors may
choose their forum and what criteria should be used to govern or
invalidate their choice are commonplace. 0 Where parties have not
specified a forum but have "contacts" with two or more jurisdictions,
the courts may be called upon to decide the choice of laws problem."1
H. Profit Sharing
Another arrangement subject to question is one in which capital
is advanced in exchange for a return of principal and perhaps interest
plus a share of the profits."' It has been suggested that "[a]lthough
198. Comment, An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends
Like That . .., 1968 U. ILL. F. 544, 575-76.
199. A recently discussed example of this is the situation where the Arkansas
constitution as interpreted by the state supreme court limits any and all finance
charges to 10% simple interest. "'Despite the fact that one-third of the Texarkana
urban population is located on the Arkansas side, 20 of 21 loan companies are operating
in Texas. According to our interviews, this concentration can be specifically attributed
to the Arkansas usury law. Lenders find it much more profitable to operate under the
higher Texas ceilings. Our research indicates that the lenders on the Texas side deal
extensively with Arkansas residents." Comment, supra note 198, at 582-83.
200. E.g. Anderson, supra note 141, at 669-71; Collins & Ham 417; Hershman, supra
note 3, at 1135-37; Shanks, supra note 55, at 350-54; Note, Usury in the Conflict of Laws:
The Doctrine of The Lex Debitoris, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1967); Note, Conflict of Law
and Usury-What Law Governs, 36 N. DAK. L. REv. 121 (1960).
201. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Publishers Collection Serv., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1200 (S.D.
Fla.), afJ'd, 446 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1971); Thomson v. Kyle, 23 So. 12 (Fla. 1897); Atlas
Subsidiaries of Fla., Inc. v. 0. & 0. Inc., 166 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964); An-
thony v. Louisiana Inv. & Loan Corp., 156 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
202. Strangely enough a similar problem faced the French Tosafists, French
Jews of the Twelfth Century, similarly troubled by interest restrictions-in their
case by reason of biblical injunctions against the charging of interest. The device
they invented and called "Hetter Iske" was a partnership or joint venture in which
the man who supplied the capital joined in the venture with a working partner
who employed the capital in his discretion but guaranteed the investment
against loss plus a minimum yield. The partnership agreement recited an
acknowledgment by the working partner that he had been paid for his work
and an agreement for the sharing of losses. The latter provision was, however,
negated by rules of evidence which made it impossible to prove the losses.
Under this agreement the debt lawfully owed was the principle plus the "profit"
and was payable at the end of a defined "trading" period.
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there are no Florida cases analyzing this problem, Florida's treatment
of disguised loans makes it almost a certainty that the value of an
equity position will be treated as additional interest. '" 20 3
I. Additional Fees Charged by Lenders
Commissions, brokers' fees, handling charges, service charges,
"points," origination fees, appraisal fees, filing fees, attorney fees, in-
vestigation fees, closing charges, bonuses, premiums, etc., are all means
by which the cost to the borrower is increased. 20 4 With all of these
charges, "[t]he key question in each case is whether the assessment
represents a reasonable fee for an identifiable service rendered or is
only an additional charge for the use, detention or forbearance of
money."'205
This straightforward statement of the question understates the
complexity of the issue. Substantial litigation and commentary has
been devoted to this very question, albeit in varying contexts. The
problem of the credit broker has been especially troublesome206
While the courts generally hold that the payment of a commission
to one acting as agent for the borrower in negotiating a loan will
not render the loan usurious, they hold different views as to the
effect on the loan when the borrower's agent shares his commission
with the lender. Most courts hold that if a part of the commission
is paid to the lender as an inducement to grant the loan, the trans-
action will be deemed usurious.207
Hershman, supra note 3, at 1138, citing G. HoRowrTz, THE SPIRIT OF THE JEWISH LAW
492. See Podell, supra note 146, at 142-45; Comment, Usury Laws: Loans for a Share of
the Profits, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 198 (1954).
203. Hadlow & Legler, supra note 153, at 573. For additional discussion on this
point, see Anderson, supra note 141, at 660 & n.61.
204. See FLA. STAT. § 687.05 (1973) (provision for attorney's fees will not render
transaction usurious); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-319 (1950) ("points" included in interest. See
also Danforth, supra note 89, at 61-64; Harrell, supra note 141, at 348-51; Hershman
,342-44; Loiseaux, supra note 146, at 422-23, 426-29; Pearce & Williams 240-42, 249; Penick,
supra note 89, at 440-41; Prather, supra note 146, at 188-91.
205. Loiseaux, supra note 146, at 428. If the assessment were not merely an "addi-
tional charge" for the use of money, the Florida courts would probably permit its
exaction even though if added to the interest charge it would render the transaction
usurious. See, e.g., Crompton v. Smith, 192 So. 186 (Fla. 1939). See also Comment, Evasion
and Avoidance of Florida Usury Laws, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 493, 499 (1951), and cases cited
therein.
206. See, e.g., Birkhead, Murray & Lochmoeller, supra note 180, at 268-69 (broker
employment form); Note, California's Legislature Faces the Small Loan Problem, 27
CALIF. L. REV. 286 (1939).
207. Harrell, supra note 141, at 348. Florida is in accord with the general rule as
stated. See Investment Funds Corp. v. Bomar, 303 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962), citing
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As one commentator has pointed out, even where the brokers "pur-
port to act as the agent for the borrower in 'arranging' loans, it is
interesting to note that the borrower is seldom aware of this alleged
relationship. ' '208
J. Computational Differences
A group of problems very closely tied to the computation of the
amount of "interest" used to determine compliance with the usury
laws is presented by prepayment 20 9 or other penalties, delinquency
fees,21 and acceleration provisions. Any extra fee charged for early
payment or otherwise should probably be prorated over the term
that the loan is outstanding to determine whether the transaction
is usurious, especially in light of the all-inclusive nature of Florida's
usury statute.2 11 But it has been argued that "[t]here is no reason why
the lender should be required to accept repayment of his money before
'the agreed term expires. It, therefore, appears perfectly legal to require
additional compensation, not for the loan but for the release before
the time agreed upon." 212 The underlying rationale of this argument
could be extended to other penalties as well: they should be con-
sidered as compensation to the lender for variances, the benefit of
which inures to the debtor.
Acceleration and its effect upon usury has been the subject of
much litigation and commentary.2 3 The main conflicts focus on
Shaffran v. Holness, 102 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (fee paid by borrower
to agent not to render transaction usurious); Applebaum v. Laham, 161 So. 2d 690 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) discussed in Boyer & Berger, supra note 169, at 323-24 (commission
taken by lender's agent made transaction usurious).
208. Birkhead, Murray, & Lochmoeller, supra note 180, at 257.
209. All of the consumer credit acts provide for prepayment rights and specify the
method of refund if the interest is precomputed. FLA. STAT. § 516.15(3) (1973) (Con-
sumer Finance Act); FLA. STAT. § 520.09 (1973) (Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act);
FLA. STAT. § 520.34(10) (1973) (Retail Installment Sales Act); FLA. STAT. § 520.84 (1973)
(Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act); FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)()(1) (1973) (bank loans
under $5,000). For a discussion of the Consumer Finance Act provision, see Oeltjen 395-97.
210. A delinquency charge is an additional assessment made on credit transactions
because payment is made later than the due date specified in the contract or loan
agreement. Delinquency charges are specifically authorized by several Florida statutes.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 516.031(2); 520.07(5), .37, .85; 627.841(1); 656.17(5); 659.18(2)(a) (1973).
For a discussion of the problems under the Consumer Finance Act, see Oeltjen 389-91.
211. See FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1973). See generally Danforth, supra note 89, at 64;
Loiseaux, supra note 146, at 431-32; Pearce & Williams 242; Prather, supra note 146, at 191.
212. Comment, Evasion and Avoidance of Florida Usury Laws, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 493, 503
(1951).
213. For a discussion of the Florida statutes, cases, and problems that they raise,
see Anderson, supra note 141, at 658-60; Boyer & Berger, supra note 169, at 321-22;
Boyer & Berger, Usury and the Viruliferous Acceleration Clause in Florida, 21 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 215 (1966); Hadlow & Legler, supra note 153, at 575-76; Hardaway,
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situations where the unearned interest is collected upon acceleration,
where the interest is precomputed, or where "interest" and other
charges are deducted from the principal sum before being turned over
to the debtor. In such situations, the shortened or "accelerated" term
should be used to compute the actual rate for usury purposes. 214 Al-
though there are contractual and other methods to avoid such a re-
sult, much of the problem has been obviated in Florida by a recent
statutory enactment which includes an "assumption that the debt
will be paid according to the agreed terms."21
IV. FINANCE CHARGES
We may define the rate of interest as the per cent of premium paid
on money at one date in terms of money to be in hand one year
later.216
A. Composition
A thorough understanding of the various components of a "finance"
or "interest" charge is necessary to understand any plea for changed
usury ceilings. Built into the charge authorized by each of the usury
provisions are several components: 1) "pure" interest; 2) inflationary
offset; 3) cost of operations; 4) risk; and 5) profit.2 17
"Pure" interest generally is the rate of return for a riskless ven-
ture that has no administrative costs. In the absence of inflation, the
closest example might be the return on a U.S. government bond.2 11 If
this were the only component of the finance charge, interest rates
from year to year and across the economy would be substantially
similar.21 9
Debtor-Creditor Conflict over Acceleration, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 163 (1964); Comment, supra
note 212, at 501-03. See also Danforth, supra note 89, at 72-74; Pearce & Williams 243.
214. E.g., Green Ridge Corp. v. South Jersey Mtg. Co., 211 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
215. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1973).
216. I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 13 (1954).
217. See generally Felsenfeld, Consumer Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process,
23 Bus. LAw. 931, 934-38 (1968); Robertson, supra note 144, at 444-45; Upton, The
Economics of Fair Charges for Consumer Loans, 16 Mo. L. REV. 274 (1951).
The classic definition of interest, "the reward for parting with money . . . a
measure of the unwillingness of those who possess money to part with their
liquid control over it," is designed to mean the lender's return over his costs.
Since this ignores the cost to a borrower who may be required to reimburse
the lender for his expenses and reward him, it is of limited value in consumer
protective legislation whose function is principally, to control debtor costs.
Felsenfeld, supra at 934, quoting J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY 167 (1936).
218. See I. FISHER, supra note 216, at 34-35.
219. See H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT, TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS 64-65 (1970), quoting
MORS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES 75-78 (1965).
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The second component, inflationary offset, accounts for the de-
creased value of the loan principal when it is repaid. 220 For example,
if we assume an inflationary rate of 10 percent, an interest-free loan of
$100 that you made to your neighbor for the upcoming year is actual-
ly going to cause you to lose $10 while your neighbor profits by the
same amount. With the 10 percent decrease in buying power it will
take $110 to buy at the end of the year what you could get for $100
today.
The third factor, cost of operations, is especially significant in
setting an appropriate rate of finance charge. 2 1 Many types of credit
are much more expensive to administer per dollar extended than
others. For instance, it would cost little more to record a $100,000
payment on a $2 million loan than it would to record a $5 payment
on a $50 stereo.2 2 2 Costs of operation can be divided into several sub-
parts: acquisition, servicing, termination, and general overhead. 22
The acquisition costs are those incurred to open the loan, including
costs of advertising, credit investigations, legal complications of draft-
ing and recording, and establishment of the "account." Servicing
would include the acceptance and recording of payments, followup of
delinquencies, collection of overdue accounts, etc. Termination would
include closing out the file on final payment or charge off and perhaps
refinancing and consolidations. The overhead category would include
items such as rent, depreciation, interest, taxes, and insurance. 24
The risk component is likewise very significant in determination
of a finance charge.2 5 Lower risk operations have fewer bad debts
and customers with a higher average "credit rating" than those institu-
220. This component is discussed and explained in A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNI-
VERSITY ECONOMICS 193-94 (3d ed. 1972).
221. See generally CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 139-47; CHAPMAN & SHAY.
222. Kripke, supra note 157, at 447. "Within reasonable limits there is a fixed over-
head cost of every loan which varies only slightly with the size of the loan." Hubachek,
supra note 180, at 630. See CHAPMAN & SHAY 20; Murphy, supra note 182, at 331; Upton,
supra note 217, at 280; Testimony of Robert P. Shay in Report to the California Senate
Subcommittee on Judiciary of the Advisory Commission on the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, January 18, 1972, at 273-76.
223. Upton, supra note 217, at 276-77.
224. Id.
225. Each time a creditor provides credit, he is making a bet. Through credit
judgment and credit scoring systems a creditor estimates the probability that a
given applicant will be willing and able to repay the debt. If he guesses cor-
rectly, the revenue he receives for the credit service provides a return on invested
capital. If he guesses wrong, he loses up to his entire investment in the account,
as well as the costs involved in its processing. Thus, operating costs associated
with the assumption of risks are reflected both in bad debt losses and in costs
of collection efforts.
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 140.
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tions which have a relatively high rate of bad debt charge off and
whose clientele have marginal "credit ratings." Factors which may
influence risk include age of debtor, his health, assets in excess of
liabilities, credit and repayment experience, size of loan, length of
term, repayment provisions, security taken, income potential, and
family situation. Since these factors influence not only bad debt charge
off but also the cost of debt collection, the risk component also in-
fluences the cost of operations. 2 6
The final component is that of profit. Profit for this purpose would
be defined as that return which would compensate the lender for his
ingenuity in combining the necessary human and capital resources to
form a successful lending operation. 2 7 If the lender is inefficient or
unimaginative compared to his competitors, he may not be entitled
to any profit.
B. The Charge
The representations with reference to charges now being made by
banks, discount companies, and sales finance companies con-
stitute a veritable babble of tongues.228
There are a variety of methods utilized in stating the maximum
permissible rate of interest. Statutes contain such references as "dis-
count, '' 229 "payable in periodic installments, ' ' 2 0 "ten dollars per one
hundred dollars per year,' ' 2 31 or "simple interest, ''2 3 2 each of which is
either a form of stating interest or influencing it. The Federal Truth
in Lending Act requires disclosure of these rates in all "consumer
credit transactions" in terms of the annual percentage rate (APR)
of finance charge.23
226. Id.
227. The profits to which I here refer are entrepreneurial profits as opposed to the
receipts of an asset owner. These latter receipts are compensated through other com-
ponents. For a quite recent and thorough discussion of the entrepreneur and his role
in society, see I KIR.ZNER, COMPETITION & ENTREPRE NEURSIP (1973).
228. Hubachek, supra note 81, at 132.
229. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 656.17(1), 659.18(1) (1973).
230. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 659.18(1) (1973).
231. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 520.34(5) (1973).
232. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 516.031(1) (1973).
233. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970). "Annual percentage rate" is defined
(1) in the case of any extension of credit other than under an open end credit
plan, as
(A) that nominal annual percentage rate which will yield a sum equal to the
amount of the finance charge when it is applied to the unpaid balances of the
amount financed, calculated according to the actuarial method of allocating
payments made on a debt between the amount financed and the amount of
the finance charge, pursuant to which a payment is applied first to.the ac-.--
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The term "discount," when used to describe the interest charge,
simply means that the interest is deducted from the loan proceeds be-
fore they are turned over to the debtor. For example, a $100 loan at
an interest rate of 6 percent discount means that the debtor will re-
ceive $94 in loan proceeds. The debtor would thus get the use of
$94 for a charge of $6. Since APR is computed on the basis of dollars
of interest charge per $100 principal per year, the ratio 94:6 = 100:x
can be utilized to determine the APR. To carry the computation fur-
ther, 94x = 600 or x = 6.4. Thus the APR of a 6 percent discount
would be 6.4 percent.
If the loan is to be repaid at the above rate in monthly installments,
the APR must again be recomputed. If the loan is being repaid in
installments, at any one point in time the debtor only has the use of
approximately one half of the principal-the outstanding balance de-
clines from $100 at the beginning of the term to $0 at the end. This
has the effect of nearly doubling the APR.23 4 To determine the exact
rate in such circumstances involves complex mathmatical computations
which are beyond the scope of this article. Since the computations are
so complex, I would strongly suggest that frequent reference be made
cumulated finance charge and the balance is applied to the unpaid amount
financed; or
(B) the rate determined by any method prescribed by the Board as a method
which materially simplifies computation while retaining reasonable accuracy as
compared with the rate determined under subparagraph (A).
(2) in the case of any extension of credit under an open end credit plan, as the
quotient (expressed as a percentage) of the total finance charge for the period to
which it relates divided by the amount upon which the finance charge for that
period is based, multiplied by the number of such periods in a year.
15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1970).
234. It is frequently said that a rate of so many dollars per $100 per year should be
doubled to find the true interest rate per annum. Then why is not the true
interest rate here 13% (2 x 6 %) instead of 12%? The answer is that the in-
stallment payments do not quite reduce the average term of the obligation to
one-half the nominal term. The average term of an obligation payable in install-
ments over 12 months is 6 2 months, not 6 months. Thus, the rate does not quite
double, because the average term is always one-half month more than one-half
the nominal term. This one-half month factor diminishes in importance as
the overall term lengthens to several years.
Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 445, 452 n.19 (1968).
The following formula can be used to approximate the true interest rate.
TRUE INTEREST RATE __
P (N + 1)
P = Amount borrowed
I = Dollar amount of interest
M Pay periods in year
N = Total pay-periods in contract .
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to annual percentage rate tables, available from many sources." 5 In the
above example, the APR would be 11.5 percent.
A rate of charge of 10 percent simple interest would be the same
as a finance charge of 10 percent APR. The only apparent difference
between the two terms is that the scope of APR is broader than
"simple interest," since the former term can also be used to describe
such non-"interest" charges as insurance and other service charges.2 3 6
Thus in a particular situation, a finance charge at the APR of 15 per-
cent may consist of interest at the rate of 10 percent "simple interest,"
insurance of 3 percent and a service charge of 2 percent.
Stating that a loan is made at the rate of $10 per $100 per year
is the same as stating the charge for the loan is 10 percent APR. But
if the loan is repaid in installments, for the reasons stated above the
rate would be 18 percent APR.
If, in addition to a finance charge stated in one of the manners
discussed above, the parties utilize points, origination fees, bonuses,
interest in advance, compounded interest,2 3 7  or "wrap-around"
mortgages, 23 8 it becomes a nightmare to determine whether the result-
ing charge is in violation of the usury laws. First it must be determined
if the charge is properly includable in "interest," and if it is, how the
charge is computed. Then one must determine the maximum per-
missible charge for the particular transaction, which may be no easy
chore. This is confusing to creditors and debtors alike. Federal Truth
in Lending has created an "incentive" for creditors in consumer credit
transactions to properly determine and state the charge as an annual
235. Annual percentage rate tables can be acquired from the Federal Reserve
System at a cost of $1 a volume for a two volume set. Volume 1 is the most useful.
Volume 2 contains the factor tables for irregular transactions.
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (1970).
237. There is also a possibility of "interest on interest," which is to be distinguished
from "compound interest." "Interest on interest is the interest paid on the interest
due upon the original sum. Compound interest is the interest paid when the unpaid
interest due is added to the principal and the resulting sum is the basis for the next
computation." Comment, Legality of Agreements To Pay Interest on Interest in New
York, 15 FORDAM L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1946) (footnotes omitted). This comment in-
cludes a chart that illustrates the difference between the two different forms of computa-
tion. Id. at 271.
Another commentator has described compound interest as "a potent mathematical
formula which, if allowed to operate to its full extent, would within a relatively short
time bring about intolerable conditions." Note, Compound Interest and the Law, 6
TEMPLE L.Q. 357 (1932). "If instead of throwing a dollar across the Potomac George
Washington had set it aside in a 6 percent fund to be accumulated for the benefit of
some heir living in 1932, the lucky person would today receive $36,000." Id.
238. See explanation of "wrap-around" mortgages at pp. 187-88 supra.
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percentage rate,239 but the businessman is still at the mercy of the
terminology and computations.
V. SURVEY OF STATUTORY USURY LAW IN FLORIDA
A. General Usury-Chapter 687
Under the current Florida statutory scheme, it is illegal to charge
more than 10 percent per annum "either directly or indirectly, by
way of commission for advances, discounts, exchange, or by any con-
tract, contrivance or device whatever," except where a greater rate
is authorized by another statute.240 This is one field where the excep-
tion entails more cases than the rule. The following pages set forth
the various rates that may be charged in each of the many segments of
Florida's financing industry. In addition to the charges set forth here-
in, in many instances "other charges" and insurance may be added.241
B. Consumer Finance Act-Chapter 516242
Under the Consumer Finance Act (CFA) licensees may loan up
to $2,500243 at rates computed according to a graduated scale. Since
the rates of interest are stated to be "simple interest, and not add-on
interest or any other computations, ' '2 4 the stated percentage rates
are equal to the APR. For the first $300 the licensee may charge up to
30 percent, for the second $300 ($300-$600) the rate is 24 percent, and
for that portion of the loan which exceeds $600 the rate is 16 per-
cent. 2
45
239. [A]ny creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transac-
tion to disclose to any person any information required under this part
to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the
sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction,
except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor
greater than $1,000; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the
court.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970). See also Lowell, supra note 141, at 211-16.
240. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1973). The maximum rate which may be charged corpora-
tions is 15% per annum. However, this rate does not apply to sales of bonds in
excess of $100 and mortgages securing the same, or money loaned on bonds. Id. Where
the contract does not specify the rate of interest to be charged, interest accrues at the
rate of 6% per annum. FLA. STAT. § 687.01 (1973).
241. See pp. 194-95 supra.
242. For a thorough discussion of the Consumer Finance Act, see Oeltjen.
243. FLA. STAT. §§ 516.02, .031 (1973).
244. FLA. STAT. § 516.031(1) (1973).
245. FLA. STAT. § 516.031(1) (1973).
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The above rates are to be applied to the "original principal
amount," which is the equivalent of "amount financed" as defined
in the Federal Truth in Lending Act.246
C. Industrial Savings Banks (Morris Plan Banks)-Chapter 656
Industrial savings banks may lend money
at a discount not to exceed eight percent per annum upon the total
amount of the loan from the date thereof until the maturity of
the final installment, notwithstanding that the principal amount
of such loan is required to be repaid in installments, plus an ad-
ditional charge not to exceed two percent of the principal amount
of any loan, which additional charge shall be for investigating the
character of the individual applying for the loan, the security sub-
mitted and all other costs in connection with the making of such
loans, all which charges and discounts may be collected at the
time the loan is made.247
Because this section authorizes deduction of the interest at the time
the loan is made, 24 8 even if the loan is being repaid in installments,
the maximum authorized APR is 20 percent. If the 2 percent service
charge were not included, the resulting APR would be 15.75 percent.
Unlike many such service charges,24 9 the creditor apparently does
not have to show that he expended such amounts; he may assess the
additional charge regardless of whether he can prove he incurred
such costs.
D. Credit Unions-Chapter 657
Credit unions may loan money at an interest rate not to exceed
1 percent per month on the unpaid balance.2 5 0 This rate is equivalent
to an annual interest rate of up to 12 percent.
E. Bank Loans Under $5,000-Chapter 659
For loans less than $5,000, banks may charge a maximum interest
rate of 6 percent per annum computed on the total amount of the
246. The "amount financed" is "[t]he amount of credit . . . which will be paid
to the customer or for his account or to another person on his behalf, including all
charges, individually itemized, which are included in the amount of credit extended but
which are not part of the finance charge . Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d)(1) (1974).
247. FLA. STAT. § 656.17(1) (1973).
248. FLA. STAT. § 656.17(2) (1973).
249. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(c) (1973).
250. FLA. STAT. § 657.14 (1973).
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loan for its entire duration. The interest may be deducted in advance
from the proceeds of the loan, and the loan may be made repayable
in substantially equal periodic installments. 251 Thus the maximum APR
is 11.5 percent.
In addition to the interest charges, the debtor may be charged
for the actual cost of credit investigations and appraisal of offered
security. Such costs may not exceed 2 percent of the principal amount
of the loan. 252 If the maximum is charged, the APR total would be
15.25 percent.
For loans which would otherwise be uneconomical to grant, the
bank is authorized to make a minimum interest charge of $3 on any
single payment loan or $5 on any installment loan notwithstanding
the fact that these would exceed the statutory 6 percent rate.253
F. Bank Credit Card Loans-Chapter 659
Banks are given the power to make loans or extend credit, not
exceeding $5,000, on a credit card or overdraft financing arrangement
and to charge interest of not more than 1.5 percent per month on the
unpaid balance of such extension of credit computed on a monthly
cycle.2 54 This allows an APR of 18 percent.
G. Premium Finance Companies-Chapter 627
A premium finance company may collect a service charge for
financing insurance premiums. The charge, which is to be computed
on the balance due after subtraction of the down payment, shall be
a maximum of $9 per $100 per year.255 This rate may be charged from
the inception of insurance coverage to the date of final payment. Thus
the maximum APR is 16.25 percent.
In addition to the above finance charge, the financier is authorized
to charge an additional $10 per premium finance agreement which
charge need not be refunded upon prepayment.2 56 If, however, the
premium is financed by the insurer or an agent or subsidiary thereof,
the charge is limited to $1 per installment, not to exceed $6 per year,
on premiums of $120 or less. For premiums of $120 to $220, the charge
may not exceed $9 per year. For premiums of over $220, the charge
shall not exceed $12 per year.2 5 7 Since the charge is to be applied to
251. FLA. STAT. § 659.18(1) (1973).
252. FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(c) (1973).
253. FLA. STAT. § 659.18(2)(d) (1973).
254. FLA. STAT. § 659.181 (1973).
255. FLA. STAT. § 627.840(3) (1973).
256. FLA. STAT. § 627.840(3) (1973).
257. FLA. STAT. § 627.901, .902 (1973).
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a range of potential principals, it is not possible to state the APR. In
lieu of the above charges, interest not exceeding 10 percent "simple
interest per annum" may be assessed on the unpaid balance.2 58 This
equals an APR of 10 percent, which is also the general usury rate.25 9
H. Policy Loans on Insurance-Chapter 627
The insurer may make a loan on an insurance policy at an interest
rate not to exceed 6 percent per annum on the amount loaned, which
amount is not to exceed the cash transfer value of such policy.
26°
I. Retail Installment Sales-Chapter 520
The seller under a retail installment contract may exact a finance
charge on the amount financed not exceeding $10 per $100 per year. 16'
The amount financed is equal to the cash price of the goods, minus
the amount of the buyer's down payment, plus the amount included
for insurance and other benefits (if not included in the finance
charge), plus the amount of the license taxes and official fees. 26 2 This
means that a maximum APR of 18 percent is authorized. Notwith-
standing the above, the creditor may assess a minimum finance charge
not exceeding $12 on any retail installment contract involving an
initial amount financed of $50 or more, $7.50 on a contract of more
than $25 and less than $50, and $5 on a contract of $25 or less.2 63
J. Revolving Charge Accounts-Chapter 520
The seller under a revolving account may charge a finance charge
which shall not exceed 15 cents per $10 per month, computed on the
unpaid monthly balances.2 64 This computes to a maximum APR of
18 percent. A $1 minimum charge per month is allowed.
265
K. Motor Vehicles Sales Financing-Chapter 520
For financing the sale of a motor vehicle, the finance charge, ex-
clusive of insurance, shall not exceed:
(a) Class 1. Any new motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer
258. FLA. STAT. § 627.901, .902 (1973).
259. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
260. FLA. STAT. §§ 625.321, 627.458 (1973).
261. FLA. STAT. § 520.34(5) (1973).
262. FLA. STAT. § 520.34(2)(f) (1973).
263. FLA. STAT. § 520.34(5) (1973).
264. FLA. STAT. § 520.35(3) (1973).
265. FLA. STAT. § 520.35(3) (1973).
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by a year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is
made-$8 per $100 per year.
(b) Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in Class 1 and any used
motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model of
the same or not more than two years prior to the year in which
the sale is made-$l1 per $100 per year.
(c) Class 3. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 and designated
by the manufacturer by a year model not more than four years
prior to the year in which the sale is made-$15 per $100 per year.
(d) Class 4. Any used motor vehicle not in Class 2 or Class 3 and
designated by the manufacturer by a year model more than four
years prior to the year in which the sale is made-$17 per $100
per year.2 66
Such finance charge is to be computed on the amount financed,26 7
which is the "unpaid balance of cash price" (the cash price of the
vehicle minus the down payment), plus insurance costs if not included
in the finance charge, plus the amount of license, taxes, and official
fees. 268 For Class 1, the maximum APR is 14.5 percent; for Class 2,
19.75 percent; for Class 3, 26.75 percent; and for Class 4, 30 percent.
In lieu of these charges, a minimum charge of $25 may be assessed.26 9
L. Home Improvement Sales-Chapter 520
Under this part of chapter 520, a finance charge is defined as
the "amount by which the time sale price exceeds the total of the
cash price and the amounts, if any, included for insurance premiums
and official fees."271 Such finance charge is not to exceed $10 per $100
per year and is to be computed on the principal amount financed on
the contract.2 7 ' The rate of interest allowable computes to 18 per-
cent APR. Under this section a $25 minimum finance charge is per-
mitted.2 72
VI. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Introduction
The provisions that regulate the price of credit in Florida have
266. FLA. STAT. § 520.08(1) (1973).
267. FLA. STAT. § 520.08(2) (1973).
268. FLA. STAT. § 520.07(2) (1973).
269. FLA. STAT. § 520.08(2) (1973).
270. FLA. STAT. § 520.61(11) (1973).
271. FLA. STAT. § 520.78 (1973).
272. FLA. STAT. § 520.78 (1973).
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counterparts of one form or another in every state and jurisdiction.
Although this is simple to verify, it is difficult to determine why so
many such restrictions remain. We have gone from a time when one
was scorned by his neighbors for being so improvident as to need to
borrow money, to an era where one must have something quite sinister
locked away in his credit file if one does not have and use a charge card.
With the change of attitude toward credit, why has there not been a
corresponding change in attitude toward its regulation? One answer
may be that "[u]sury laws imposing inflexible price ceilings on money
and credit are historical vestiges of the erroneous supposition that
emperors, kings and governments could effectively fix all prices. ' '2 7 3
There must be more to usury limitations than the quote suggests, be-
cause in most other sectors of our economy we disdain price controls
except in emergency situations and for utilities, which are state-
granted monopolies. Perhaps, as one author suggests,
[a] theoretical distinction is possible between two kinds of usury
laws-a price-fixing variety, and a "moral" variety, which does not
fix the price of money, but outlaws fraudulent trade practices.
Before the Civil War, American usury laws were obviously price-
fixing laws, or tried to be; but rhetoric appropriate to "moral"
laws was often used to defend them. The laws themselves made no
distinction between big and small borrowers, weak and strong ones,
secured or unsecured debt.274
But with the legislative "innovations" of the post Civil War period,
the complexity and segmentation of today's regulatory scheme arose.
And even today, "[m]any businessmen, politicians, and consumers ...
(even those who favor free market prices as a general policy), tend
to favor legal limits on the price (interest rate) which may be paid
or received for money or credit.' ' 2 75
Moral and religious grounds, together with the theory that capital
is nonproductive,2 76 which historically prompted usury restrictions,
produced the present hodgepodge of regulations and exceptions. These
laws remain, but the rhetoric has changed. 217 Today's arguments are
273. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, Prefatory Note xix (1968).
274. Friedman, supra note 67, at 521.
275. Wheatley & Gordon, supra note 195, at 22.
276. See discussion of history of usury pp. 171-84 supra.
277. Some of the original rhetoric remains. The "exaction of usury is odious, illegal
and immoral." First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Norwood Realty Co., 93 S.E.2d
763 (Ga. 1956). But cf. Prather, supra note 146, at 182:
That arbitrary rate ceilings have little to do with morality is demonstrated by
their across-the-board applicability and their general failure to make any ex-
ception based upon the ability or willingness to pay. A man who borrows not
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phrased in such terms as "economics," "unconscionability," and "bar-
gaining disparity".
[Most important] is the striking disparity in bargaining power be-
tween the two parties to a typical consumer credit transaction of
any magnitude, coupled with the average consumer's almost total
lack of understanding of the legal implications of the transaction.27s
Proposals to increase rates or to sustain current levels which may
be unpopularly high are met with such arguments as:
The tragedy is that, as with most of the pro-creditor provisions of
the draft, the brunt of these high rates will be borne most heavily
by low to moderate income consumers.2 7 9
It is also to be remembered that he [the person who would borrow
money at these higher rates] is the man who can least afford to
pay .... 280
Let there be no mistake about it; the Code [U3C] would impose
a rigid interest rate structure which will fan the fires of inflation
and have the greatest impact on those who can afford it least.28 1
These arguments are not to be taken lightly, but neither is the
constricting effect that reduced or low usury limitations have on the
availability of certain types of credit. 2 2 A recognition of this con-
flict prompted Senator Douglas to present an even more complicated
issue:
At what point does a rate become so high that society expresses the
judgment that it is unconscionable and that the individual must do
without the credit rather than pay the unconscionably high
rates? 28S
What, then, is an unconscionable rate of interest? At one extreme
from need but from an incentive to accumulate more money has the same rate
ceiling applied to his loan as the unemployed man who borrows to buy food.
278. Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation, A Canadian Consumer-Oriented View-
point, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 490 (1968).
279. Shick, supra note 131, at 465.
280. McReynolds, Legislative Remedies Possible Under the Missouri Constitution
of 1945, 16 Mo. L. REv. 292, 299 (1951).
281. Statement of the Consumer Federation of America on the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code before the Virginia Consumer Credit Study Commission, May 24, 1971, at 3.
282. See note 318 inIra.
283. Statement of Senator Paul H. Douglas before the Legislature of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, January 29, 1969.
1975]
208 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:167
is the "6 percent myth"2 4-6 percent is "the proper rate." On the
other extreme are those who would abrogate all limitations and find
no charge "unconscionable." In narrowing the parameters we find
statements such as the following:
The most unbelievable part of this whole story is the fact that the
Russell Sage Foundation was able to sell many legislatures in the
United States an interest rate of 31/2 percent per month, or 42 percent
per annum, as a reasonable rate of interest. The only explanation
which can be given for that salesmanship is that the proposal came
from a charitable trust and was offered as the solution for a socio-
logical problem. . . . If the rate of interest proposed had been
suggested without "benefit of clergy," to-wit, the charitable front,
it would not have been entertained for a single moment by any
legislature. . . . As one writer put it, "It was from social agencies
that the small loan companies learned the trick of immunity by
legislating unconscionable rates under the guise of serving the for-
gotten man, the necessitous borrower. '' 28 5
I also believe an interest rate ceiling of 42% on credit trans-
actions under $300 is entirely too high and borders on the un-
conscionable. 2 8s
In discussing the rate ceilings of the U3C it has been suggested that
[r]ate ceilings [maximum ceiling under the Code for a consumer
transaction is 36 percent] are provided to nip the unconscionable
transactions which result from a joining of an unwary or desperate
consumer with an avaricious credit grantor.2 8 7
To give persons a right to charge 36 percent-plus interest (or finance
charge) shocks at least my conscience and I do not believe that I am
unduly sensitive. 288
284. "A '6% myth' is found by many investigators to be the basis of consum-
ers' expectations about the normal charge for credit. [T]he type of state legislator who
is always ready to defend motherhood and the American flag has a field day with any
effort to breach visibly the 6% ceiling." Kripke, supra note 157, at 447. "That al-
most no consumer credit is handled at six percent seems to make little difference. Six
percent remains almost as fundamental a standard as the Golden Rule." Felsenfeld,
supra note 217, at 931.
285. McReynolds, supra note 280, at 295-96.
286. Separate Statement of Senator William Proxmire in CONSUMER CREDIT IN U.S. 221.
287. Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23
J. FINANCE 303 (1968).
288. Comment by the Honorable George Brun, a Berkeley, California, municipal
court judge, as quoted in A Consumer Credit Code . . . for lenders, 1969 CONSUMER
REP. 131.
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Those who would keep a low ceiling on the cost of credit are
hopefully not so simplistic as to believe that lower rates merely mean
that consumers will save money at the expense of lenders' profits.
It must be realized and remembered that advocates of a low ceiling
are making a conscious decision to deny credit to a segment of society.8 9
The basic question is, therefore, what rate is too high for a borrower
to pay although he is not able to obtain credit otherwise? No doubt,
some such rate does exist. An interest rate of 100 per cent certainly
seems too high for anyone to pay. A person who can satisfy his
debts or needs only by borrowing at 100 per cent perhaps should
be left to the bankruptcy courts and public assistance. 290
These views by no means aid us in finding the boundary of un-
conscionability. Because each transaction is unique, perhaps no mean-
ingful maximum can be determined. Rather the very nature of usury
dictates that rates be set by our present very subjective and arbitrary
process.
What additional rationale can be presented to bolster the belief
that the cost of credit should be subject to price control while other
staples, such as a loaf of bread, usually are not? A simplistic, but un-
satisfying, answer could be that "[m]oney [is] unique because it [has]
no substitutes. If wheat were the only known food, 'without which
we must famish and die,' its price too would surely be regulated." 291
Professor Johnson has suggested two possible economic rationales
for the imposition of rate limitations such as ceilings. 292 First, he argues
that the "credit market is so imperfect that consumers seldom pay a
'fair' price for their use of credit. ' ' 293 His second argument is that
"within each given credit market, suppliers of credit may have
monopoly power, so that even with perfect knowledge consumers may
be overcharged for their use of credit. '" 2 9 4
One market imperfection is that consumers cannot effectively shop
for credit because of their lack of meaningful knowledge. Furthermore,
this imperfection cannot be cured through disclosure provisions such
as Truth in Lending295 because confusion and complexity are inherent
289. See note 318 infra.
290. Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 56 A.B.A.J.
946, 948 (1970).
291. Friedman, supra note 67, at 520, citing N.Y. ASSEMBLY Docs., VOL. iV., Doc.
No. 118, at 3 (1858).
292. Johnson, supra note 82, at 90.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
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in the nature of credit. Disclosure appears to raise the consciousness
of debtors as to the price (interest charge) of credit.29 6 But a potential
debtor not only shops for the best price of credit, he also is concerned
with such nonprice factors as size of required down payment, terms for
repayment (including amount of periodic payments), security require-
ments, and collection policies.29 7 Indeed, in many instances the size
and duration of the payments may be the determinative factor.29a If
the credit is sale credit, as opposed to loan credit, the prime considera-
tion probably will be the product which the consumer seeks to pur-
chase. 299 This "grocery store" choice of credit combinations arguably
makes rate competition virtually meaningless to the consumer.85 ° In
fact, several studies have shown this, and have sought to explain why
296. Studies commissioned by the National Commission on Consumer Finance
indicated that "[i]n the 15 months after TIL [Truth in Lending] became effective sub-
stantial increases were found in levels of APR awareness." CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
U.S. 176.
In spite of this improvement [after Truth in Lending as compared with before],
however, borrowers are still largely unaware of the rate of interest they are
paying, even though this rate has, by law, been imparted to them. Only one
tenth of borrowers can estimate the rate of interest they are paying on a car
loan with a 10 per cent margin of error and nearly half of all borrowers miss
the mark by 50 percent or more.
Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An Empirical Test of the
Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FINANCE, 1143, 1153 (1971).
Disclosure was also found to have done little for the poorly educated, low income con-
sumer. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 176-82.
[O]ur survey has shown strong indications that for one, rates of interest on in-
stallment credit are less available to the general public since the truth-in-lending
legislation came into effect than they had previously been; that consumers had
shown little, if any, additional concern over the costs of their borrowing, despite
the disclosure of additional information to them; and that finally, the cost of
providing credit to the consumer sector has risen appreciably as a result of
the costs involved with complying with the new law, and that, as a result,
such loans have become less profitable for many institutions and retailers.
Angell, Some Effects of the Truth-in-Lending Legislation, 44 J. Bus. U. CHI. 78, 83 (1971).
"[T]he disclosure provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act will be largely ineffective in
changing consumer behavior patterns." White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to In-
terest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REv.
1207, 1239 (1971). See generally CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 169-91.
297. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 179; Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus.
LAw. 777, 786 (1971).
298. See, e.g., Shay, The Price of New Automobile Financing, 19 J. FINANCE 205,
220 (1964) ("To the consumer, the price of credit to finance his purchase of a car
is a joint product with the car itself. He has been primarily concerned with the com-
bined cost of the product and credit as reflected in the size and duration of his
monthly payments.').
299. See CONSUMER CREDIr IN THE U.S. 181-82.
300. But cf. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 177 ("Even though only 38 percent of
all consumers using closed end credit may be aware of the APR, and even though
relatively few of them use it in comparison shopping, these may be enough to bring
about price competition .... ")
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the consumer has a high degree of insensitivity to the level of interest
rates a
01
A second imperfection is the monopolistic tendency of the credit
market30s  For the most part, the consumer credit market is localized;
that is, there is no national credit market. Very few consumers will
shop for credit outside of their city, and many will not go out of their
neighborhood. 3  The only exceptions-mail order and borrowing
against the cash surrender values of insurance policies-constitute a
very small proportion of the market.30 4 This situation creates monopoly
power in the local credit grantors. Such power is manifested most
often in the common cry that at whatever point rate ceilings are set,
that is what the credit grantors will charge. 30 5 Support for this common
complaint can be readily found. If one were to call all of the finance
companies in a given location and request, for example, the finance
charge on a $325 loan for the maximum repayment term that they
would grant, the answers received would vary little from each other
or from the ceiling rate. To obtain further proof, one could seek a
$1,000 consumer bank loan. "Competing" banks would likely quote
substantially the same rate, which would be near or at the statutory
301. See, e.g., Juster, Consumer Sensitivity to the Price of Credit, 19 J. FINANCE 222
(1964); White & Munger, supra note 296, at 1222 ("Is it not remarkable that a majority
of the new car buyers [in the authors' sample] have [sicl been paying 25% more
interest than they had to pay?").
302. Johnson, supra note 292, at 95-97.
303. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 11. "Not only do the poor pay more for
money, they are also caught in the net of neighborhood credit monopolies. To tighten
a lucrative hold on their customers, many stores and loan companies refuse to trade
information with credit bureaus. Consequently, many low-income consumers who have
never missed a payment to the local furniture store or loan shop nevertheless cannot get
credit elsewhere." A Consumer Credit Code . . . for lenders, 1969 CONSUMER REPORTS
131. "The inadequacy of competition in the inner city marketplace is well known."
Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAW. 777, 780 (1971).
304. See Johnson, Statement Submitted to the House Interim Committee on the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the Uniform Deceptive Sales Practices Act, State
of Hawaii, Oct. 21, 1971, at 12.
305. Examples of this "cry" can be found in Ripley, Proposed Consumer Credit
Code Stirs Conflict, Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 18, 1969, at 10, col. 2; State-
ment of Blair C. Shick before the Florida Legislature, March, 1972, at 11; Statement
of the Consumer Federation of America on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code before
the Virginia Consumer Credit Study Commission, May 24, 1971, at 5: "It is common
knowledge, especially in disadvantaged areas where there is such a disparity of economic
strength, that legal maximums quickly become the accepted norm. Once those rates
are cloaked with the legitimacy of law, no creditor or seller will hesitate to impose
the maximum whether warranted by competitive economic conditions or not." See
Statement of Richard A. Elbrecht, Hearings on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
Before the Advisory Commission on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code to the Sub-
committee on Judiciary of the Senate General Research Committee of the California
Senate, in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, REPORT TO
THE SUBCOMMITrTEE ON JUDICIARY OF THE SENATE GENERAL RESEARCH COMMITrrr 305 (1972).
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maximum. The same thing would be found for credit unions, which
are both owned by and established for the benefit of their member
depositors and debtors. The dearth of rate competition within the
various segments of the credit industry is paralleled by the lack of
competition among the various classes of our segmented credit in-
dustry: banks do not compete for the business of the consumer finance
companies, consumer finance companies do not compete with retail in-
stallment sellers, etc. Even though prices vary, finance companies usual-
ly extend credit only to those borrowers who present too high a credit
risk to be advanced credit by a bank or by a major retail establish-
ment. Each segment of the credit industry caters to a particular
group of borrowers classified by type (consumer or commercial) and
risk. These classes are distinguished by the rate ceiling permitted each
segment. For example, consumer loans made by banks at 15 percent
APR are necessarily made to lower risk borrowers than comparable
loans made by consumer finance companies at 30 percent. Debtors
can move up the interest scale; one who is entitled to a 15 percent
bank loan can also borrow at a finance company which is authorized
to charge up to the 30 percent maximum. But the debtor whose credit
standing only entitles him to a 30 percent loan has few sources from
which to borrow.
But you might reasonably ask, isn't this natural? Shouldn't bor-
rowers with less capacity to repay debt have fewer credit sources
to borrow from? My reply would be nol Borrowers with less
capacity to repay debt should not be able to obtain as much debt
as borrowers with greater capacity to repay, but they should have
as many sources to choose from. Why argue that higher risk bor-
rowers should face fewer credit sellers each of who[m] has a cor-
respondingly greater monopoly position in the market?30
An additional problem, which can be couched either in terms
of unconscionability or economics, is oversupply or overextension of
credit.30 7 This situation is encouraged by our system of successful,
convincing product and service advertising and offers of "easy credit."
Because of this pressure and "[t]he ready availability of credit . . .
some families . . . overextend themselves by borrowing more than
they can really afford. ' ' 30 8 In many situations this overextension can
have detrimental social costs.
306. Shay, supra note 161, at 774.
307. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 99-102.
308. Separate Statement of Senator William Proxmire, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
U.S. 229. See also Separate Statements of Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan and Congress-
man Henry B. Gonzalez, CONSUIER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 239, 242; Ziegel, Consumer Credit
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The unwarranted inducement to bite off more credit than one can
chew (or possibly repay) is causing more divorces among young
people in South Carolina than alcohol or adultery.30 9
The social costs of overextension are categorized by Professor
Wallace as (1) public subsidization of the credit regulatory system;
(2) lost productivity due to "court appearances, meetings with
creditors, and general psychological stress"; (3) loss of respect for
government; and (4) extreme hardship for the debtor and his family.310
It would seem reasonable to assume, though, that any creditor who
wishes to remain in business will not extend credit to one he knows
is going to default. Nor is the creditor lying in wait for innocent
debtors to overextend themselves so that he may exercise unconscion-
able harassment. 3' Assuming that the debtor has the "willingness to
pay, 3 12 his default is going to be based on an inability to pay. This in-
ability may arise in several ways-loss of employment, loss of ability to
work, or unexpected drains on family budgets such as illness. Only
a small percentage of the cases of inability to pay are caused by
voluntary overextension-borrowing more than the debtor is able to
pay at the time.3 13
But what about rate ceilings? Do we really need them? 31 4 Do they
Regulation: A Canadian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 492-93
(1968).
309. Statement of Senator Jack Lindsey in SOUTH CAROLINA COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE AND FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, REPORT OF
FINDINGS 109 (Supp. to Journal 16, Jan. 1971).
310. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 470-71
(1973). See CHAPMAN AND SHAY 25-27. In a survey to determine the causes of personal
bankruptcy and the underlying financial difficulty,
[t]he leading reason, given by 31 percent, was poor debt management-too many
debts, unwise refinancing, overspending. Their decisions about borrowing or
buying depended only on whether or not they thought their current income
could support another monthly payment. All too seldom did they evaluate the
total cost involved or their future prospects.
Next as underlying causes were family health reasons (sickness, injuries, babies,
death), 28 percent, and job problems like layoffs, strikes, and loss of overtime, 20
percent. Then 13 percent cited threats of legal action or hounding by creditors,
followed by 10 percent who mentioned actual legal action-suit, garnishment,
repossession.
D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971).
311. See Kawaja, The Economics of Statutory Ceilings on Consumer Credit Charges,
5 W. ECON. J. 157, 160 (1967).
312. "Willingness to pay" includes such factors as personal integrity and the break-
down of creditor-debtor relationships, the latter caused by such practices as consumer
fraud. Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the Consumer Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAW. 795,
796 (1971).
313. Id. at 796-97. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 101.
314. "[T]he need for rate ceilings lies more in the realm of philosophy and politics
than in economics." Johnson, supra note 292, at 97.
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really serve their intended purpose of preventing citizens of the
particular jurisdiction from being overcharged for credit or forced
to pay an unconscionable price for credit?31s Who is protected by the
rate ceilings? 16 The person who is now able to obtain credit at rates
below the ceiling (all persons who obtain bank credit could be in-
cluded in this class because they pay at rates below those permitted
the consumer finance companies) is not protected by the ceiling. The
person who is now unable to obtain credit from any source except
illegal loan sharks hardly seems "protected," and surely does not ap-
preciate being "protected against his own improvidence." The debtor
who is in the no-person's land between 15 and 30 percent, the one
who cannot get a bank loan and is overqualified for a consumer
finance loan, is not benefited. The only person the rate ceiling really
protects is the debtor who is entitled to a rate which approximates
the legal ceiling and who would have paid, in a free market system,
a higher rate because of careless shopping.3 17 It should be added that
loan sharks probably profit from rate ceilings because low ceilings in-
crease the pool of credit risks who cannot obtain credit 18 and are thus
prime targets for "easy" loans from their friendly shark.3 19
315. See CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE U.S. 103-07.
316. "[L]ow rate ceilings do provide protection for consumers, but only some con-
sumers. In the sales credit field they protect credit buyers at the expense of cash
buyers. In the cash loan field they protect affluent borrowers at the expense of less
affluent borrowers." Statement by Professor Robert W. Johnson, Hearings on the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, February 26, 1969.
317. E.g., "Some people, of course, are oblivious to competitive prices and will pay
whatever they are charged .... " Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 393 (1968).
318. The Washington experience demonstrates that interest ceilings affect credit
availability. In the year following a rate reduction from 18 to 12%, credit ex-
tensions dropped significantly (25% in the number of personal loans), both in
number and dollar volume, despite an increase in retail sales. Wheatley & Gordon,
supra note 195, at 24. In addition, "[v]irtually all financial institutions and retailers
tightened their lending policies by increasing downpayment requirements and by
shortening loan maturities." Id. at 23. For a discussion of the effect on small loan
companies of a drastic reduction in Missouri's interest rate in the mid 1940's, see Spiva,
Operations of Lenders in the Small Loan Field from 1939 to the Present, 16 Mo. L. REv.
234, 239-41 (1951).
Nugent, Three Experiments with Small-Loan Interest Rates, 12 HARv. Bus. REv. 35
(1933), shows that lowering the small loan rate in two states greatly restricted the
volume of loans compared with those states which did not lower rates. See also Shay,
Factors Affecting Price, Volume and Credit Risk in the Consumer Finance Industry, 25
J. FINANCE 503, 513 (1970), and studies discussed therein (Shay's "research suggests that
when rate ceilings are higher, licensed small loan lenders do accept poorer credit
risks .... "); Goudzwaard, Price Ceilings and Credit Rationing, 23 J. FINANCE 177, 185
(1968): "[P]rice controls have important economic and credit rationing effects on credit
availability at consumer finance companies."; Chapman & Shay 144; Separate Statement
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History is replete with cases where loan sharks have lobbied in
legislatures for unrealistic minimum rates, knowing that such
meaningless ceilings would permit them to charge much higher
ratesA
20
[M]ost consumers forced from the legal cash loan market into the
hands of loan sharks are represented in no statistical sample, pay
rates that are unreported and undisclosed, and must remain mute
when legislatures lower price ceilings on consumer credit in well-
intended efforts to afford greater "protection" to some other bor-
rowers.A2
1
In the realm of sales credit, rate ceilings seem to have even less
meaning. In most instances the credit and the sale are a single package
-if the seller cannot legally charge more for the credit he merely
raises the price of the goods to be sold.3 22 In these situations the cash
buyer, including both the person who voluntarily shuns credit and
the person who is not creditworthy, subsidizes the credit buyer. 2S
of Robert Shay in CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 249-59 ("Rate ceilings were found to
be significantly related to both availability and price (APR) in the personal loan
market, to availability only in the new auto market, and to neither availability nor
price (APR) in the other consumer goods market." Id. at 259).
But see Goudzwaard, Rate Ceilings, Loan Turndowns, and Credit Opportunity, 6
W. ECON. J. 404 (1968) (findings suggest that high rate ceilings do not expand credit
availability); Sartoris, The Effect of Regulation, Population Characteristics, and Com-
petition on the Market for Personal Cash Loans, 7 J. FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 1931, 1951 (1972) (rate increase would have more effect on segmentation of
market than on its size); Separate Statement of Senator Proxmire in CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE U.S. 228 ("An increase in rate ceilings will simply increase a lender's total revenues,
and like Parkinson's law, the lender's total costs will rise to absorb the additional
revenues. More money will be spent on staff, salaries, travel, advertising, office fixtures
and space, convention going and lobbying. Profits may also increase. However, the
net amount of credit extended will not appreciably change.').
319. Murphy, supra note 182, at 331.
320. Statement by Dr. Paul A. Samuelson before the Committee on the Judiciary
of the General Court of Massachusetts in Support of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, January 29, 1969.
321. CONSUMER CRQTrr IN THE U.S. 105.
322. See, e.g., Comment, An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With
Friends Like That . . .", 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544, 588 (discussing the Arkansas situation
under a 10% usury limitation); Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Percent Simple: The
Arkansas Case, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 592, 599, 606, 618-19; Wheatley & Gordon, supra note
195, at 24) (the authors report that, in response to a lowering of the interest limitation
from 18% to 12%, "Fifty-six percent of nonautomobile retailers said that they raised
prices an average of 5% on all merchandise in their stores .... "); Federal Trade Com-
mission, Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District
of Columbia Retailers xiii (1968) (the costs of "easy credit" to high risk debtors are
usually reflected in the form of higher merchandise prices).
323. This latter situation prompted Professor Johnson to point out: "[You require
those who are less affluent and less creditworthy-those who cannot get credit and
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At this point it should be obvious to the reader that the law
governing usury has been, is, and may continue to be a complex
social and economic problem; that any attempt at additional piece-
meal legislation similar to what we have had to date is highly un-
satisfactory; that changing economic and societal conditions prompt
changes in the usury laws; that the arguments for the present scheme
are emotionally charged and perhaps deceptively convincing; and that
an immense amount of effort expended on this issue by courts, legis-
lators, lawyers, economists, and other academics has produced little
except volume, complexity, and perhaps a touch of the absurd. As-
suming that these observations are obvious and suggest the need to
study alternatives to the present scheme, there are several proposals
for action to be considered. These proposals can be grouped into
the following models: (1) organized inaction; (2) loan sharking plus;
(3) public utility; (4) free market; and (5) compromise, including
but not limited to unconscionability, variable or sliding scale, or any
other mix of the various models.
B. Organized Inaction
The organized inaction model includes measures designed to im-
prove operation of our existing structure without fundamentally
altering the present scheme. Basically, pursuit of organized inaction
would involve increasing current interest ceilings to relieve some of
the present stress caused by two-figure inflation 324 and enacting piece-
meal legislation aimed at prohibiting or regulating the worst abuses
of the usury statutes. Additional legislation could be enacted to over-
rule those court cases which have relaxed or misinterpreted the usury
limitations.
The most ideal solution within this classification would be a com-
prehensive, voluminous statute, with comments, that would put all
of the rate ceilings, rules, exceptions and resulting complexities im-
who must buy for cash-to subsidize the credit purchases of more fortunate citizens.
This is class legislation at its worst." R. Johnson in National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, Statements in Support of the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code Filed with the Sub-Committee on Consumer Affairs of the Banking and Currency
Committee of the House of Representatives, Wash., D.C., Feb. 26, 1969, at 21 (emphasis
added).
324. "Our industry [consumer credit lenders], if it is to prosper and survive in
this world of change, cannot be shackled with obsolete loan maximums. It cannot
operate in a straitjacket of regulatory requirements designed to protect the necessitous
borrower of 1916. It cannot continue to do the same type of business in the same old
way if it is to meet the changing trends of consumer demand." Robinson, The Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code, A New Way of Life for the Consumer Loan Industry, 22
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. 118 (1968).
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mediately at the regulators' and lawyers' fingertips. s25 Organized in-
action could thus postpone dealing with some of the pressing and
obvious problems and could make it easier (possible?) for lawyers
and judges to function in the area. Nonetheless, as soon as economic
or societal conditions change, pressure groups may again force a re-
organization.
Another stopgap plan would be the enactment of a small, small
loan law which would make small amounts of credit available to
the necessitous borrower 26 at rates which would cover the lender's
expenses and permit him a fair measure of profit. 27
C. Loan Sharking Plus
The second model is one in which rates and structure remain
basically unchanged, but in which there is an option to lower rate
ceilings and place additional nonprice restrictions on lenders, the
restrictions being carefully designed to lessen competition. In so
doing, a conscious decision would be made to allow the loan sharking
industry to operate essentially as it does now. One author has suggested
that society could adopt this position without being amoral.3 28 Under
325. Though using the rhetoric of a freemarket system, the U3C provided an op-
portunity for many state legislatures to lower certain rates and collect various credit
laws in one statutory location. The enacted versions have little resemblance to a
free market approach. "Rate ceilings are provided to nip the unconscionable transactions
which result from a joining of an unwary or desperate consumer with an avaricious
credit grantor." Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
23 J. FINANCE 303 (1968).
326. "This-this particular type of loan goes to somebody who is-I claim to be a
necessitative borrower. He borrows for rent. He borrows for a bottle of whiskey. He
borrows to get into a crap game. And I think there are things about this loan money
that must be taken care of in a very regulated manner or else he will rob a filling sta-
tion or else you give it to him. And somebody had to make the judgment. And this
is just simply an area that has to be recognized." Statement of Richard L. Wheatley,
Jr., Hearings, supra note 305, at 288.
327. The National Commission on Consumer Finance suggests that rates as high
as 94.66% on a $100 loan are economically justified. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 141-45.
See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-3.16 (1971).
328. Seidl, Let's Compete with Loan Sharks, 48' HARV. Bus. REV., May-June, 1970, at
69, 75. Loan sharking and other extortionate extensions of credit are, however, illegal
both under federal and state law. The Consumer Credit Protection Act, recognizing
the problem involved in extortionate extensions of credit, states:
An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect to
which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time it is
made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment could result
in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm to the person,
reputation, or property of any person.
18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1970). Such an extortionate extension of credit can be punished by
fines of up to $10,000 or a maximum of 20 years imprisonment or both. 18 U.S.C. §
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this model, the legitimate sources would deal with borrowers they
could afford to serve profitably within the established structure. Loan
sharks would service those who could not receive the desired service
in the upper world.3 29
The loan shark is an effective and efficient means for controlling
high risk loans. While other creditors worry about such matters as
security, collection efforts, and form dunning letters to insure pay-
ment, the loan shark relies on his reputed connections with organized
crime, a universal belief that he will resort to physical violence to
collect his due, and the borrower's expected need for future services.
3 30
Normal lending practices are formal, complicated, and time consuming
procedures that usually involve the posting of collateral. Many bor-
rowers want the secrecy, informality, speed, convenience, and availabili-
ty the loan shark offers. Legitimate lending institutions are precluded
from offering equivalent services because of low interest ceilings.
3 3 1
The usual loan sharking procedure starts with the lending of a
lump sum from a "boss" to a "lieutenant" at 1 percent interest (called
"vig" or "vigorish") per week. The lieutenant loans it to the street
worker-the person we call the "loan shark"--at 1.5 to 2.5 percent
interest per week. The money is then lent to borrowers at 5 percent
892(a) (1970). Also note that similar state laws are not preempted by these federal pro-
visions. 18 U.S.C. § 896 (1970).
In 1969, Florida adopted similar statutory procedures. FLA. STAT. § 687.071 (1973). In
addition to outlawing criminal usury by making the charging of interest of less than
45% but more than 25% a misdemeanor of the second degree, and the charging of
45% and more a third degree felony, Florida also prohibits extortionate extensions
of credit. Anyone who makes such an extension or conspires to do so can be charged
with a felony of the second degree. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.071(2), (3), (4) (1973). No
extension of credit made in violation of these provisions is an enforceable debt in
Florida courts. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(1) (1973).
329. Seidl, supra note 328, at 75. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 46 (footnote
omitted): "Loan sharks prospered [before licensed consumer finance companies existed]
because legitimate lenders could not profitably lend to consumer borrowers under the
low usury ceilings."; Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer Credit,
19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 4, 4-5 (1954): "The bare costs of small installment loans to
wage earners could not be covered by the percentage charges permitted under orthodox
usury laws. Legitimate lenders could not supply the constantly growing demand at a
loss." See generally Simpson, Costs of Loans to Borrowers Under Unregulated Lending,
8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 73 (1941). See also M. NEIFELD, THE PERSONAL FINANCE
BUSINESS, 283 (1933).
330. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 91, 95 (1969). One loanshark described a first meeting with a borrower, in which
the borrower couldn't understand why the loan shark did not need collateral, as follows:
"'The borrower couldn't understand this too well. He was simply told in no uncertain
terms that "Your body is your collateral."' - Miller, The Impingement of Loan Sharks on
the Banking Industry, 149 THE BANKERS MAGAZINE, Winter 1966, at 84, 85.
331. Seidl, supra note 328, at 72.
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per week "32 (260 percent per year) to 20 percent per week (1,040
percent per year). 3 3 It has been estimated that $1 million loaned by a
"boss" can generate over $4 million in interest for all persons in the
chain,334 and up to $1.3 million for the "boss" alone.3 35
The loan sharking business of today has little resemblance to the
friendly village noteshaver of yesterday. Today's system not only forces
people who are desperate for loans to suffer the web of intanglement
a loan shark weaves, but also grants organized crime a continuing
source of income approaching $1 billion per year.3 3 8 The hazards to
both the individual borrower and society from the involvement of
organized crime in loan sharking are numerous. First, there are no
practical limits on the lender's practices-no state or federal officials
conduct internal audits or enforce Truth in Lending. Second, since
the guiding principle of loan sharking is to maximize profit, all
available money must be kept out in loans to the various lenders at
very high interest rates. By discouraging the repayment of principal-
by refusing to accept payment in installments, for example-the loan
shark generates additional interest. In one case, a $1,900 loan led to
payment of $14,000 in interest over a three-year period, with $5,800
still unpaid; this is not unusual.3 . 7 Third, loan sharking leads to in-
creases in criminal activity by forcing borrowers to commit crimes to
repay their loans. 318 Exacerbation of crime rates is particularly evident
among the urban poor, who have high demands for money but few
legitimate sources from which to obtain it.139
In addition, "[s]mall businessmen who need working capital; specu-
lators, promoters, and producers who need venture capital; and in-
332. Seidl, supra note 328, at 71; Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of
Organized Crime, supra note 330, at 94.
333. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 94. The quoted rate stems from the traditional "six for five racket" in which a loan
of five dollars required the paying of $1 per week in "juice" as long as the principal
was outstanding.
334. Miller, supra note 330, at 85.
335. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 93 n.20.
336. Id. at 92. See also Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New
York's Usury Statute, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (1966). Minnesota was estimated to be
suffering a $5 million annual loss of income to loan sharks in 1936. Burnquist,
A Regulatory Small Loan Law Solves Loan Shark Problem, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROa. 29,
32 (1954).
337. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 96. See generally Seidl, supra note 328, at 72.
338. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 97.
339. Id. at 100. Historically loan sharks focus on urban areas. See generally Nugent,
The Loan Shark Problem, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1941). See also CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE U.S. 46.
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dividuals who need personal funds to satisfy spending habits or correct
illegal business activities" constitute a large loan market for the loan
shark.3 40 Through such loans, loan sharks gain access to legitimate
businesses,3 41 which provide depositories for illegally gained money.
Taking over a legitimate business gives the loan shark an opportunity
to perform a "bankruptcy caper." This scheme involves borrowing
as much as possible on the good will of the business from legitimate
sources, milking the business of funds, and then allowing it to go
bankrupt.3 42
The modern loan shark and his syndicated "bosses" are also in-
filtrating the banking system. They use tellers and loan officers as
contacts for borrowers, as a means of getting large-volume loans at
standard bank rates, and as a means of exchanging for cash the checks
that the loan sharks receive, without endorsement or without de-
positing them in an account.3 43 There also are reports that organized
crime is attempting to enter the management of banks.3 44
The social costs of loan sharking are high, and traditional usury
laws foster rather than inhibit its growth. For this reason Capt. John
M. Seidl proposes to compete with the loan shark in the marketplace
for high risk loans.3 45 The heart of his proposal is the establishment
of legitimate high risk lending institutions that offer the same secrecy,
informality, speed, convenience, and availability of loans that a loan
shark offers.3 46 He points out that though these firms will be at a
competitive disadvantage because they will not be able to use criminal
340. J. Seidl in National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Statements in Support of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code filed with the Sub-
Committee on Consumer Affairs of the Banking and Currency Committee of the House
of Representatives, Wash., D.C., Feb. 26, 1969, at 24.
341. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 99. For examples of loan sharks working in banks, see Miller, supra note 330, at 86,
90.
342. Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, supra note 330,
at 99.
343. Miller, supra note 330, at 88-89.
344. Id. at 90.
345. Seidl, supra note 328.
346. This is illustrated by stories of just how accommodating loan sharks are. In
one case an antique dealer needed a continuing line of credit. Banks would only offer
him a standard $10,000 loan with regular paybacks. The dealer did not want this, so
he refused. " 'One day I met Ed. He offered me $2,000 in a pinch-no questions asked.
From then I did business with him.' " Seidl, supra note 328, at 72.
In another case an automobile salesman ran out of cash just before Christmas while
at a bar. " 'I called Jimmy and told him I needed a couple of hundred until the first.
Thirty minutes later Jimmy arrived. He'd driven from South Philly through the snow
that had been falling since early afternoon. He handed me $200 and left. Where else
could I get that kind of service? I'd gladly pay extra for the couple hundred, wouldn't
you?' " Id. at 69.
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means to collect loans, the duplication of the loan shark's informal
services, together with lowering risks to the borrower and reducing
his need for future loans, will offset any advantages the loan shark
has. "The key is to duplicate the service elements in loan shark trans-
actions while eliminating the threat of physical violence in the collec-
tion process. ''3 47
Seidl's proposal is, in reality, an extension of the Uniform Small
Loan Laws developed by the Russell Sage Foundation. Both proposals
stem from one underlying and controlling fact-it is impossible to
destroy the loan shark by means of the criminal laws alone. 4 If society
wishes to curtail the harmful effects of loan sharking, it must challenge
the economic base on which loan sharking rests by providing legitimate
competition to the loan sharks.
D. Public Utility
The public utility approach contemplates greater, more complete,
and more careful regulation of the credit industry than we presently
have 4.3 9 The goals in regulating credit as a public utility would be to
give the public the best service at the lowest cost and assure "fair"
profit to creditors, assuming we did not wish to operate the system
publicly. To insure an "equitable" system, we would first have to
decide whether we wanted to establish a single rate of credit charge
applicable to all borrowers regardless of intended use, need, or credit-
worthiness or whether we should establish a series of rates applicable
to various groups of the borrowing public. Groups would be defined
by reference to such factors as loan purpose and borrowers' wealth, age,
and credit experience.
If the single rate approach were chosen, a subsidiary question is
whether the service would be open to all borrowers or only to those
whose personal criteria show a repayment probability above a pre-
established cutoff point. The repayment probability and cost of
servicing eligible borrowers would determine the "raw" rate. To this
would be added (or subtracted) a differential for inflation (or defla-
tion) and the prescribed "fair" rate of profit. The main drawback of
this scheme is that it could never happen. A wealth transfer of this
form, where "good" credit risks who are economically entitled to a
347. Id. at 76.
348. Seidl, supra note 328, at 75. See also Loan Sharking: The Untouched Domain
of Organized Crime, supra note 330, at 125-26.
349. But even the existing system wherein "[t]he privilege of lending to the poor
was granted by the state to a few lenders who had to meet prescribed standards of
character and fitness . . . [i]s similar to a public utility franchise .... ." Jordan &
Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 390 (1968).
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10 percent rate are forced to subsidize "poor" risks who cannot borrow
money except at rates which approach or even exceed 50 percent,
would and probably should not be permitted to exist. Furthermore,
under such a system careful supervision would be required to ensure
that each licensee financed a proper mix of high and low risk debtors-
an excess of one or the other could give it more or less than a "fair"
return. The complexity and inequity of such a system is, hopefully,
obvious.
The second alternative, that of carefully dividing borrowers into
several classes,350 each class having a different cost structure and result-
ing rate, would be highly complex but surely not beyond the capacity
of modern computer technology. Such a system would be equitable
to the majority. But the poor-those who can least afford high rates-
would still have to pay a premium for loans, since the higher probabili-
ty of default and the fact that the small loans the poor are likely to
seek occasion a higher operating cost per dollar loaned. Further-
more, once placed in a high rate classification, it may, as a practical
matter, be difficult to make timely progressions to lower plateaus.
The cost of instituting such a scheme probably would be high when
compared to the advantages gained.35 1
To attempt to regulate credit as a public utility
would be a major error .... In the first place, public utilities are
usually industries with heavy investment in fixed capital equipment
so that competition among them is wasteful and inefficient. The
consumer credit industry has relatively few fixed costs and few of
the other economic characteristics which would favor the establish-
ment of regulated monopolies in this field. Under the public utility
approach there would be constant pulls and tugs from consumer
groups resisting rate increases, requesting lower rates and greater
service while industry groups would argue for higher rates to offset
higher costs and elimination of unprofitable service.
Most economists would agree that such a policy would be un-
desirable.3 . 2
E. Free Market System
The third model is many an economist's dream-the free market
system.
350. This differs from the present system in which the lenders are divided into
several classes, each with a different rate structure. Cf. notes 240-72 and accompanying
text supra.
351. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 102-03.
352. Statement of Robert P. Shay, Hearings, supra note 305, at 272.
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I know of no economist of any standing . . . who has favored a
legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lend-
ers receive-though there must have been some. I know of no country
that does not limit by law the rates of interest-and I doubt that
there are any.353
Those who oppose interest rate restrictions view credit markets as
relatively efficient when left alone to operate freely. According to
this position free competitive markets lead to an optimum alloca-
tion of resources and maximum individual satisfaction. Consequent-
ly, interferences with normal credit flows by use of imposed ceilings
on lending or deposit rates can only create inefficiencies in financial
markets which hamper production and exert an adverse influence
on the distribution of goods and services.35 4
Since this is one of the more seriously contended proposals I will
devote proportionately more space to its exploration.
A system with few government controls could boast many initial
benefits: (1) the very costly process of regulation, which surely feeds
the fires of inflation and fuels bureaucratic waste, could be eliminated;
(2) the whole area could rapidly become less complex as the need
to devise schemes to increase revenues by skirting usury laws evaporates;
(3) through competition, debtors would be charged only what their
risk class dictates; (4) merchants of debt would be limited to a mar-
ginal rate of return; and (5) credit would be made available to a wide
spectrum of potential borrowers. The basic theory of this system is
that competition among sellers (creditors) for the buyers' (debtors')
business (loans) will keep the price (interest charge) at the lowest
sustainable level-equilibrium, in economic jargon. If the price drops
below this level, sellers will leave the business, and the price will
rise. Conversely if the price is above this level additional sellers will
enter the market, and the price Will fall. Buyers' (debtors') behavior
will also be influenced by the price. Less credit will be purchased
when the price is high -than when it is low, and conversely, more
credit will be purchased when the price is low. So far, this explanation
is but a simplified version of a textbook definition of a competitive
market. To apply this definition to the credit picture, various pre-
requisites to a functioning market must be examined.
In order to have a viable market system it is important that there
be competition. "A highly competitive market exists when the
number of sellers is so large and entry is so easy that no seller has
353. Friedman, In Defense of Usury, NEwswEEK, April 6, 1970, at 79, quoted in
Wheatley & Gordon, supra note 195, at 22.
354. Bowsher, supra note 27, at 17.
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power over price." '355 But will competition work to bring credit charges
into perspective? Those who argue for lowered ceilings base their
arguments on the "fact" that creditors most always charge the ceiling
rate and that "creditors seem unwilling to compete on the basis of
rates." 5 6
It can be shown, however, that lack of competition is not in-
evitable. 3 57 Those states that have enacted corporate exceptions to the
usury statutes have not experienced non-competitive practices in this
particular area. Creditors in those states that authorize interest in ex-
cess of 18 percent for revolving charge have maintained the 18 percent
limit. In the past, banks have usually charged below the ceiling limit, 58
and competition has been quite common in the financing of auto-
mobiles,35 9 major appliances, and homes.
That many interest charges today hover at the legal ceiling probably
indicates that current rates are too low. "In earlier years when interest
rates and operating costs had not generally pressed rates to the ceiling,
the maximum permitted was not the prevailing rate."3 60 This was true
not only of banks but also of finance companies and credit unions. An
examination of the 1974 economy, when increased interest rates froze
up sources of credit for all but the corporations, strongly suggests that
rates at the maximum permitted level resulted primarily from
355. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 109. The basic requirements for a perfectly com-
petitive market are summarized and applied to the consumer credit market in Johnson,
Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAW. 777 (1971).
356. Statement of Richard A. Elbrecht, Hearings, supra note 305, at 305: "[C]reditors
have refused to advertise the rates they charge and seem intent, instead, on hiding
them in the fine print . . . . This is proof that there is relatively little, if any, rate
competition at present. The spirit of competition is simply not present." But cf. Prather,
supra note 146, at 181: "Rates in the money market are not set by any diabolical collusion
among banks, savings associations, or other lenders; when the nation as a whole decides
to spend more money on goods than can be financed out of the current flow of savings,
interest rates go up." See also Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical
Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 53 (1969).
357. For a discussion of evidence that competition works, see Johnson, Rate
Competition, 26 Bus. LAW. 777, 783-84 (1971), and authorities cited therein.
358. See, e.g., Smith, Pricing Policies on Consumer Loans at Commercial Banks,
25 J. FINANCE 517 (1970).
359. A study of automobile financing in Oklahoma after the adoption of the U3C
found that 75% of the "contracts were in the effective rate area of between 11
percent and 16 percent, annual percentage rate . . . . [T]hese figures are significant
because they represent over 100 million dollars in automobile installment contracts, bar-
gained by individual dealers with individual buyers from small towns to cities, across
the State of Oklahoma." Statement of Richard L. Wheatley, Jr. to the Florida House
Committee Studying Uniform Consumer Credit Code, February 21, 1972, at 9. See also,
Benfield, supra note 290, at 947-48; Shay, The Price of New Automobile Financing, 19
J. FINANCE 205, 219-20 (1964).
360. Statement of Robert W. Johnson, Hearings, supra note 305, at 251. See CON-
SUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 96-99.
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economic conditions. For example, few home loans were being made,
and those few were made with down payments of 20-30 percent,
whereas a few months earlier, rates of at least 2 percent below the
usury limitation with merely 5 percent down were common.
These are not isolated examples of competition; they show that
competition is possible and does work.36' But the question remains
whether we are going to trust the market on the basis of these observa-
tions when common experience provides numerous examples of non-
competitive behavior: charging ceiling rates, offering identical credit
packages, grouping debtors into classes to be served only by certain
segments of the finance industry, and take-it-or-leave-it prices. Many
of these symptoms can be readily explained. One reason for the uni-
formity of rates among the various credit grantors in a particular
segment is the complexity of the total credit package. Apart from the
subjective risk factors concerning each debtor, the creditor needs to
consider legal maximums on rates and sometimes on maturities, and
the amount of security available. Most creditors have found it easier
and more profitable to establish a credit package, which they then
offer to all potential debtors who meet certain minimum qualifica-
tions .3 2 In Florida, a person who wishes to borrow $300 and does not
qualify for the banks' 15 percent package, but is overqualified for the
finance companies' 30 percent package, must choose between the 30 per-
cent package or no loan at all. If he "buys" the loan, then the finance
company has improved its overall risk and can expect either an im-
proved profit picture or can increase volume by extending credit to
debtors who may be underqualified.
The rigidity of credit offerings is due in part to the graduated
rate ceiling. It is nearly impossible to compute the interest charges
and resulting APR for Truth in Lending disclosure purposes without
access to a programmed computer or rate chart. Most creditors use a
single chart based on the set of rates which is currently the statutory
maximum,363 and others already have the maximum rate pre-printed
on their standard disclosure and obligation forms.
The prevailing statutory maximums further explain the lack of
competition: when one financial institution-a bank-may legally
charge less than one half as much as another type of institution364-
a consumer finance company-it is not difficult to understand why they
do not actively compete for the same type of business. Why should a
361. It has been said that the laws of economics may be frustrated by the acts of
legislatures, but they cannot be repealed.
362. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 113.
363. See Statement of Richard A. Elbrecht, Hearings, supra note 305, at 305.
364. See, for example, the Florida rate structure discussed pp. 201-05 supra.
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consumer finance company compete for the bank's business when it,
has the whole higher-risk, personal finance business to itself? Con-
versely, how can a bank be expected to effectively compete for the
personal finance business if it can charge only half as much?
[U]niformity requires either raising the existing ceiling for one or
lowering it for the other, or both; and it is less disruptive to allow
banks to lend at the higher small loan rates than to limit small loan
companies to lower bank rates. Once it is decided to set legal
maxima above the existing ceilings for some creditors, the con-
sumer interest requires that there be some incentive to charge less
than the maximum and the policy of encouraging competition
responds to this need.36 5
A uniform ceiling . . .would encourage credit grantors to experi-
ment with different rates of charge in order to penetrate new markets
and to adjust to changing economic conditions. This would reinforce
the present trend toward diversification, discourage consumer seg-
mentation, and bring increased competition into the field as a
whole.366
Intra-industry competition, however, is not the only factor affect-
ing rate structures and credit availability. If the rate of interest which
an industry can profitably pay for its supply of capital is below the
market rate, that industry will be outbid by users of capital who can
afford to pay more." ' A recent example of this is the home and
365. Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMPLE
L.Q. 313, 318 (1970). One misguided advocate of competition suggests that the way to
insure that there is adequate competition is to repeal all of the exceptions to the usury
law, so that all lenders can compete at the same level, that of the general usury law.
McReynolds, supra note 280, at 317-18.
366. Johnson, supra note 82, at 101. The drafters of the NCA recommend that states
adopt a "unified and consistent rate which applies across the board to all creditors"
because discrimination often results in hardship to consumers. They left blanks for
interest rate ceilings, however, saying that existing rate ceiling statutes in a state should
provide the basis for these amounts. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 2.201, Comment 2.
367. "[E]ffect of the rate of interest on the supply of funds .. . rather than on the
demand .. . implies that changes in the rate of interest will not affect the demand for
funds as much as the supply, and that lenders will have to use other methods, i.e.,
credit rationing, to cope with the excess demand." Catt, "Credit Rationing" and the
Keynesian Model, 75 ECON. J. 358 (1965). The author goes on to explain why this "is
not merely a frictional imperfection of the money market but is a chronic condition
arising out of the essentially rational behavior of lenders, especially the larger institu-
tions who lead the market." Id.
"[Many] legislatures have exempted loans to corporation [sic] from the usury statute,
no doubt in partial recognition of the convertibility of the capital market between
equity stock and interest bearing investment." Statement of Marion Benefield in SOUTH
CAROLINA COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE AND FEDERAL CON-
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personal mortgage market. In many locations, loans of this type could
not be made because the rate which savings and loan associations and
similar lending institutions had to pay for their capital was either
above the legal limit that could be charged the mortgagor or so close
to it as not to permit a margin for cost of operations, risk, and profit.
Another question is whether the price of credit actually influences
the amount of credit purchased. Obviously, one will use more credit
when it is free than when there is a service charge. This fact explains
the massive growth of bank cards and other revolving charge systems
utilizing 30-day "free" accounts. But if rate ceilings were removed
and the average rate of charge were to significantly increase, would
the volume of credit be reduced? If rates went down, would volume
increase so as to duplicate traditional market theory? Several of the
studies that have been conducted in this area suggest that the change
in demand for credit does not keep pace with the change in rate. Thus,
it is said, the demand for credit is relatively inelastic.
Most consumers are in fact unresponsive, but only because they
are constrained to accept shorter contract maturities than they would
prefer. By implication, if credit institutions were to offer longer
maturities at finance rates commensurate with the added risks, con,
sumers would become rate sensitive because they would no longer
be rationed. . . . In short, consumers appear to be unresponsive to
finance rates because they do not have access to anything like a
perfectly competitive capital market. The closer capital markets
come to this analytical ideal, the more sensitive will consumers be
to the cost of funds. s68
SUMER PROTECION ACT, REPORT OF FINDINGS 57-58 (Supp. to Journal 16, Jan. 1971).
"[Y]ou absolutely cannot make money available at below cost by passing a law." Id. at 56.
"It was the general opinion of those involved in commercial lending that the ten
percent ceiling had a very restrictive effect on the flow of risk capital into the state
and that it was in large measure responsible for Arkansas' status as a capital-poor
state." Comment, An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like
That . . ." 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544, 584. "The nationally recognized small loan companies
have generally avoided Arkansas because of the unlikelihood of a profitable
operation under the ten percent ceiling." Id. at 574. But cf. Separate Statement of
Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 238 ("[I]n a period of
tight money, unrestricted rates for business credit siphon off vast amounts of money from
housing and from other essential purposes. I do not subscribe to the philosophy that
we should permit investment funds, willy-nilly, to go to those credit purposes which
bring the highest return.").
368. Juster, Consumer Sensitivity to the Price of Credit, 19 J. FINANCE 222, 233
(1964). In their econometric studies of consumer sensitivity to finance rates, Juster and
Shay found it a necessity to qualify the
widely held view that consumer borrowing decisions are wholly unresponsive
to changes in finance rates, aside from the effect of rate changes on monthly
payments. This generalization appears to be valid for rationed consumers-
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The degree of inelasticity would vary, however, among different
types of debtors. Those who use credit only as a convenience will
show a much greater elasticity of demand than those who are credit
rationed, those who because of lack of creditworthiness cannot obtain
as much credit as they desire. In fact, as the legal rate increases, the
creditor can afford to extend credit to those who were not credit-
worthy at the lower rates.36 9 As to this group, an increase in the price
of credit could result in an increase in volume. 7 °
The expected increased volume of credit for the affected class of
borrowers could be cited as justification for maintaining lower rates.
Increased availability would, it could be argued, foster debtor over-
extension and its resulting "evils." ' ,, In answer to such a charge, Pro-
fessor Kripke in a different context has suggested:
If society determines to make the decision for the poor that they
shall not have what they want to purchase, the result can be
achieved in a far better fashion .... If society determines to deny
these [credit] purchases, the solution is a re-enactment of the war-
time Regulation W of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
those whose preferred and actual debt positions are different. It is not valid
for unrationed consumers-those whose preferred and actual debt positions are
equal. At present the majority of households in our sample, and an even larger
majority of the population, are probably in the rationed category; hence, the
above generalization may well be valid in the main.
The authors then go on to point out that the percentage of rationed consumers may
diminish as lenders continue their extension of debt maturities, which tends to shift
those who are rationed to unrationed status, and that the "secular growth of incomes
and wealth may also mean that the proportion of households in the unrationed
classification will increase over time." F. JuSTER & R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO
FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 45-46 (Occasional Paper
88, Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Res. 1964). See also Shay, The Price of New Automobile
Financing, 19 J. FINANCE 205, 219-20 (1964) ("As maturities have been extended from
8-10 months in 1916 to 36 months in 1955 and thereafter, the maturity effect on the
size of payments has been stronger than the effect of changing finance rates upon the
demand for credit. But in periods of time when the increase in average maturity slackens,
or whenever it may reach a limit, the finance rate can be expected to exert a stronger
influence upon the demand for credit."); Juster, supra, at 222. But cf. SMITH, supra
note 358 (the assumptions of inelasticity of demand are inconsistent with in-
direct evidence relating to loans from banks); Adie & Fruend, Responsiveness of Bor-
rowers to Finance and Credit Life Insurance Rate Changes of Four Types of Lending
Institutions, 11 NEB. J. ECON. & Bus. 3, 15 (1972) (concludes that "customers are
more responsive to changes in the cost of credit and credit life insurance than had
been shown in previous studies .... ").
369. See note 318 supra, discussing the effect of rate changes on the availability of
credit.
370. Such a result could be anticipated when any governmental "rationing" is
removed. Another quite recent example is the queues which were present at gasoline
stations until both the price and supply were permitted to increase.
371. For a discussion of overextension and its resulting evils, see pp. 212-13, supra.
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System .... In war-time the goal was to cut down the civilian
pressures on scarce materials; but the technique could be used to
accomplish the result desired by our informal social planners of
denying [credit] to the poor .... 372
Lastly, in order for a market system to work, participants need op-
tions for which to cast their market "votes." In an area where creditors
are highly segmented but concentrated and borrowers have little choice,
the rates would tend to be higher and more noncompetitive practices
could be expected. 7 The present segmentation of the finance industry,
in which various subgroups of creditors operate under different statu-
tory authority, ceiling rates, capital requirements, and licensing
standards, substantially restricts movement of capital within the in-
dustry and prevents much intra-industry competition for borrow-
ers.
74
The key to reforming the credit industry is a change of emphasis.
Today, we stress reducing competition by imposing loan size and
maturity limits,7 5 low ceiling rates,3 76 licensing,377 and such artificial
372. Kripke, supra note 132, at 34. In the article, Kripke goes on to explain how
such a return to Regulation W could work. Id. at 34-36. "That some people are excluded
from obtaining credit at a lower maximum interest rate than at a higher rate does
not tell us whether the exclusion of such persons from credit sources is good or bad.
Judgment as to that must be formed by use of one's philosophy about freedom and
paternalism, rather than from empirical information." Dunham, Research for Uniform
Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. LAW. 997, 1000 (1965).
373. E.g., "[L]imiting the number of lenders enhances the practicability of their
arriving at a tacit understanding among themselves to fix volume and finance rate[s]."
Kawaja, The Economics of Statutory Ceilings on Consumer Credit Charges, 5 W. EcoN.
J. 157, 164 (1967).
374. See Johnson, Economic Rationale of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 J.
FINANCE 303, 307-08 (1968). But cf. Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A
Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 53, 58-59 (1969) (retain the segmentation rather
than scrap 50 years of experience); Statement of Senator Jack Lindsay, supra note 309, at
109 ("By continuing to segment our consumer laws and making them consistent and
compatible, we can better build upon our reasonably good foundation of consumer
laws, without abandoning the stability that we find generally existent today.").
375. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 163-64.
376. "How would industry structure be changed if ceilings on consumer finance
charges were lowered? The evidence ... indicates that the industry would be more heavily
concentrated in the hands of the large lenders." CHAPMAN & SHAY 146. Accord, CONSUMER
CRDIT IN THE U.S. 136-37.
377. See generally Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAW & EcoN. 93 (1961).
"Practitioners of licensed occupations usually support licensing on the ground that it
is in the public interest; many economists, on the other hand, feel that such licensing
;is designed to give monopoly power to members of the occupation." Id. In answer to these
two viewpoints, Moore found that "[a] survey of occupations and businesses regulated
and the requirements for entry imposed indicates that the least restrictive types of regu-
lations were imposed for the public welfare while the most restrictive types appear to
have been established to benefit practitioners of the regulated occupations and
businesses." Id.
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controls as character and fitness,378 minimum capital,379 and "con-
venience and advantage" requirements.3 0 We should instead stress
active competition3 81 and rigid enforcement of the antitrust laws. 8
Though regulation may be necessary to protect depositors, there is no
comparable reason to protect debtors from having creditors compete
for their business. On the other hand, some of those who argue for
limitations on competition suggest that there is some efficiency in
size, and by limiting entry into the field we protect debtors from
harsh and abusive collection practices of creditors barely making a
go of it 883
378. "Because of historic association of high-rate small loans with the underworld,
'character and fitness' licensing is provided in this field ....... Braucher, Consumer
Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 313, 318 (1970) (foot-
note omitted).
379. For arguments supporting a minimum assets requirement, see Harper, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 53, 62-63 (1969).
380. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 162-63; Stokes, Convenience and Advantage
in Small Loan Licensing, A Workable Standard, 2 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 93 (1960).
See also Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24
Bus. LAW. 227 (1968) (In addition to presenting arguments urging the retention of
"convenience and advantage," Harper points out that this standard is found in some
form in all banking laws and is included in 34 small loan statutes as well as many in-
dustrial loan statutes.); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical
Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 53, 61-62, 65-66 (1969). For additional arguments against
"convenience and advantage" see Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 391-92 (1968); Robinson, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: A New Way of Life for the Consumer Loan Industry, 22 PERSONAL FIN. L.Q. RE'.
118, 123 (1968); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's View, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 491, 512-13 (1969) (distinguishes rationale for "convenience and ad-
vantage" in the 30's under Uniform Small Loan Act from present situation); CHAPMAN &
SHAY 156-60.
381. One way to foster competition is to eliminate or greatly decrease restrictions
on entry. But it may be questioned whether restrictions on entry really work. In an
econometric study of entry into the banking industry it was estimated that in the
absence of legal restrictions on entry, about twice as many banks, approximately 2,200,
would have been chartered in the years 1936-62. Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking,
8 J. LAW & ECON. 11, 48 (1965).
382. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 3, 136-39, 161-67.
383. "[U]nbridled entry would promote overselling by some lenders, especially by
those without experience in the consumer lending field; many ill-informed or financially
irrational borrowers would succumb to the blandishments of easy credit and become
overcommitted; duplication of facilities and inefficiency would result; the increased
competition would tend to lead to wild credit practices to the detriment of all; and
the effect of such a concept on the monetary and fiscal policies of the United States
was an unknown quantity, the ramifications of which had not been fully explored."
Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry, 24 Bus. LAW. 227
(1968).
"Over-zealous competition will eventually result in loan abuses, and the sheer mag-
nitude of numbers of lenders will result in the inability of proper supervision and
regulation of the lenders, and will bring new catastrophy and heartache to many South
Carolinians." Statement of Senator Jack Lindsay, supra note 309, at 106.
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Such reasoning cannot be sustained. If credit practices are un-
healthy, the solution is not to regulate credit, but to outlaw the par-
ticular offending practices. Such practices may even be self-defeating
for the creditor.384 Furthermore, studies on efficiency find few cost
differences between large lenders and small lenders-although, to be
efficient, offices must do the amount of business for which they were
designed. 38
F. Compromise
The last model consists of several proposals which have common
elements: they do not have rigid ceilings nor do they adopt an absolute
free market system. The most flexible system of this type would per-
mit the parties to agree on any interest rate, but allow courts to declare
a loan transaction usurious if the interest rate were excessive and the
loan, taken as a whole, were harsh and unconscionable 86
384. Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the Consumer Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAW.
795, 799 (1971).
I have confidence that in a truly free market, one in which lenders would not
be ashamed to advertise their rates, the mechanism of competition would insure
reasonable rates, and would sort debtors according to their ability to pay. In
this market system, I would approve of creditors charging higher interest rates
to the poor than to the rich. But, by the same token, I would demand that interest
rates be determined by past performance rather than by arbitrary criteria. Thus
if a poor person has demonstrated that he is a good risk in that he pays
promptly, he should be entitled to the same low interest rate as the more
affluent debtor. To present this proposition in a dramatic form, I am prepared
to entertain the following rule: any person who reaches the age of 21 and is
ready to enter the world of consumer credit, should be issued credit at the
highest rate, irrespective of his wealth or job security, perhaps a rate as high
as 100 per cent. Should he prove to be a reliable debtor, the rate of interest
charged him should be reduced accordingly. If over the years, some debtors
prove to be extremely reliable by paying promptly and thus freeing their
creditors of all collection costs, then they should be accorded such premium
rates as 9 or 10 per cent.
Id. (emphasis added).
385. Upton, The Economics of Fair Charges for Consumer Loans, 16 Mo. L. REv.
274, 282 (1951). "Perhaps the most striking finding in our exploratory studies is that
there is customarily a fairly wide range of optimum sizes-the long run marginal and
average cost curves of the firm are customarily horizontal over a long range of sizes.
This finding could be corroborated, I suspect, by a related investigation: if there were
a unique optimum size in an industry, increases in demand would normally be met
primarily by near proportional increases in the number of firms, but it appears that
much of the increase is usually met by expansion of the existing firms." Stigler, The
Economies of Scale, 1 J. LAW & ECON. 54, 71 (1958). Cf. Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of
Industry Costs and Earnings in CHAPMAN & SHAY 55. "Companies which make com-
paratively larger numbers of loans per average office are more profitable and, as the
analysis also indicates, there is a significant tendency for large companies to achieve
higher degrees of loan office utilization." Id. at 56.
386. Note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for
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Another approach is enactment of a usury law similar to the
English Money-lenders Act of 1900,387 which declares unconscionable
interest charges to be illegal. The act sets an unconscionability rate of
48 percent. This is not an absolute rate; charges on either side of this
percentage give rise to certain rebuttable presumptions. All charges
over 48 percent are presumed unconscionable, but the creditor may
prove otherwise by showing that the particular charge was justified in
the circumstances. Charges under 48 percent are presumed conscion-
able, but the debtor is permitted to prove otherwise by showing that
the charge was not justified and thus was unconscionable.3 8  The main
drawback of such a system is that it would seem to encourage litigation.
However, that does not appear to be a common English complaint, and
the English courts have decided the unconscionability question on a
sufficiently wide range of rates and situations to provide guidance in
the future determination of rates.3 8 9
Furthermore, the unconscionability tool seems to be an effective
tool in the credit realm where presently used.
The [Oklahoma U3C] administrator has this terrible tool called
the law suit regarding unconscionability. And what we found is
that, any time you have a credit-connected abuse, that by use of
this tool you can ... go direct to the person granting the credit...
[and break] up almost any kind of credit abuse practices .... The
consumers are happy. You know, we don't have anybody in Okla-
homa complaining, except the creditors.3 9 0
Another possibility would be to tie the rate of charge to a flexible
Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105, 108 (1955). See also Meth, A Contemporary Crisis: The
Problem of Usury in the United States, 44 A.B.A.J. 637 (1958). "Usury is the excessive
exaction of interest . . . [and] the taking, upon contract, of interest in excess of [state
maximums] shall be deemed prima facie excessive." Id. at 640.
387. The Money-lenders Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 51. See also The Money-
lenders Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 21.
388. CoNsuMEt CREDIT IN THE U.S. 94. Most of the Canadian Provinces utilize an
unconscionability standard for credit which five provinces limit to loan credit, there
being no limit on sales credit. Also Germany and Australia rely primarily on un-
conscionability to limit credit charges. Id. at 94-95. For a more extensive discussion
of the Canadian situation, see Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation, A Canadian Con-
sumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 488, 493-97 (1968).
389. In Meston, Rate of Interest in Moneylending Transactions, 1953 SCOTS L.T.
(News) 133, the author discusses the English cases on what constitutes an unconscionable
rate of interest. Toward the end of the article there is a summary of the cases suggest-
ing that the rate would begin at about 10% for loans secured to as high as 177.7%.
Id. at 137.
390. Statement of Richard L. Wheatley, Jr., Hearings, supra note 305, at 291.
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standard, such as the Federal Reserve Rediscount Rate.91 or some other
presently existing index. Recently it has been suggested that Florida
interest limits be permitted "to rise and fall quarterly with the money
market. The suggested limit would be 150 percent of the average
interest charged on a particular type of loan the previous quarter.'" 3 92
Regardless of the index used, if it reflects the market, when capital
becomes scarce the ceiling rates could freely move upwards. When
the contingency passes and the indicator responds, the rates would
readjust.
Like the unconscionability scheme, a sliding scale system could
be subject to the charge of being difficult to administer. Over a period
of time, the same types of loans would be subject to varying regulations.
When the "transaction" took place could well become a subject for
litigation. For example, on a rewriting or consolidation of existing
loans, do we apply the original rates pro rata or do we apply the rate
as of the day of the change in the account after crediting the debtor with
the proper rebate of unused interest? Furthermore, to eliminate the
problems of segmentation which have been so detrimental to com-
petition, whichever standard is adopted should utilize a single standard
rather than adopt provisions of the Florida proposal that perpetuate
segmentation through use of a standard based on past transactions of a
particular class or type.
The policy of adopting unconscionability or a sliding scale as our
norm is to prevent those few transactions in which we believe the
rate charged is so far beyond what we deem reasonable that it cannot
be sanctioned, while permitting the market to operate in a relatively
unfettered fashion. Unconscionability offers additional flexibility over
the other alternatives. It permits the creditor to show why he needs to
charge more than the established rate. It would then be left to a trier
of fact, whether in an administrative or court proceeding, to deter-
mine if his reasons are sufficient.
391. This is the standard suggested in a model statute proposed in Merriman &
Hanks 13-15.
"In Germany in some consumer credit legislation the maximum finance charge for
some types of consumer credit is geared to the central bank discount rate .... " Dunham,
Research for Uniform Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. LAW. 997, 1002 (1965).
392. Shaw, Floating Ceilings on Interest Rates Proposed in State, St. Petersburg
rTimes, January 14, 1975, § B, at 5, col. 5 (proposed before Florida House of Representa-
tives Commerce Committee). This proposal could also have been noted in the section on
organized inaction because apparently it still has vestiges of a segmented rate-"average
interest charged on a particular type of loan." Id. (emphasis added).
"In France the general usury laws define as usurious any loan whose interest is more
than 1/2 times the interest charged generally in the credit market for loans of similar
cost and risk." CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 95.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The usury regulations of today have been enacted piecemeal and
in an ad hoc fashion, and have often been based upon myopic views
of society and its needs. Examples and hypotheticals accompanied by
intense emotion have been used to justify usury legislation that, in
many instances, proved detrimental to our financial and societal struc-
tures. In such cases the hard evidence was less than convincing and
highly unreliable. If this emotion could be removed from the policy-
making process and the situation viewed objectively and in perspective,
uniform solutions would be forthcoming. The goal is not insur-
mountable.
The first task in drafting uniform solutions is to isolate the causes
of the highly charged emotions. The group always singled out as
needing our consideration is that composed of the uneducated and
economically disadvantaged. The viability of any proposal should not
be questioned solely because of its influence on this class; the law
should be directed to the majority of society. Let us eliminate this
class, at least momentarily, from our consideration. If there are similar
groups in the consumer or business communities, they should also be
eliminated from consideration when formulating an overall policy
toward usury.39 3
If these eliminated groups constitute a significant segment of so-
ciety, we need to develop innovative programs for them, not more or
new forms of regulation. 94 Groups so disadvantaged in the bargaining
and market process as to need special protection and assistance are
unlikely to benefit from complicated and unaccessible regulatory pro-
tections. Several innovative programs aimed at providing credit to
the poor, the young and other inexperienced debtors, the less credit-
worthy, and others who are classified as "eliminations" have been pro-
posed and discussed, but few have ever been tried.3 95 Even the most
393. See generally CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 151-60.
394. See Dunham, Research for Uniform Consumer Credit Legislation, 20 Bus. LAW.
997, 1002-03 (1965); Engman, How Government Regulation Has Become the Curse of
Consumerism, 2 BARISTER 58 (1975).
395. See, e.g., CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE U.S. 156-60; Caplovitz, Breakdowns in the
Consumer Credit Marketplace, 26 Bus. LAW. 795, 799 (1971) (quoted supra note 384);
High, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-A Rejoinder by an Economist, 50 TEXAS
L. R.v. 463, 472 (1972). Examples given include limited-income credit unions, govern-
mental consumer loan fund, government insured consumer loans, development of credit
scoring systems to better predict repayment frequency than present systems which
are based mostly on financial and educational status. If adequate scoring systems could
be developed, for example, many of the poor could cease to be "eliminations" and
could safely be included in whatever system was adopted for the remainder.
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successful trial to date, the Uniform Small Loan Act, has outlived its
evolutionary usefulness.
It makes little sense to subject those who survive the elimination
process to the high costs of intense regulation. Of the five models pre-
sented, the free market approach should best fulfill the needs of, and
be totally acceptable to, the members of this group. There are few
who would argue that a free market approach to usury would be un-
workable in our system. Any such free market approach must facilitate
competition; all institutions should be free to enter and compete in
the lending arena with little governmental interference and restriction.
Furthermore, the tack of any type of regulation should be to improve
and stimulate competition among lenders.3 9 6 If some marginal pro-
tection is deemed essential, the unconscionability concept with a high
presumptive limit could be established without doing great violence
to the market approach.
If it takes governmental support to stimulate and insure innovation
and an adoption of workable proposals, it will be well worth the price
to the taxpayers. The resulting savings to society from a revamping
of the present system would be immeasurable.
396. E.g., antitrust legislation and enforcement.
Raising rate ceilings is another method of stimulating competition. "Somewhat
paradoxically the inclusion of finance charges in advertising copy occurred more fre-
quently in states with highest ceiling rates than in those with lower ceilings. This
probably reflects price competition for the more desirable types of loans as this
practice was also related to the differentials in rates .... ." Smith, Pricing Policies on
Consumer Loans at Commercial Banks, 25 J. FINANCE 517, 520 (1970).
Another possibility for new legislation would be . . . to require lenders who ad-
vertise to disclose in their advertisements the rates at which they make various
loans. . . . [Under current law] lenders remain free to ignore rates entirely in
their advertising. Indeed, a recent GMAC television advertisement features
a heavy-breathing jogger. The point of the ad is that it is much more convenient
to come to GMAC to buy the car and borrow in one spot than it is to run to
one place for insurance, to another place for a loan, and to a third place for
the car. Perhaps GMAC should be required in such an advertisement to disclose
the rate at which it will lend against new cars.
White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-
Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REv. 1207, 1240 (1971).
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